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Executive Summary 
 
This paper evaluates the short term impacts on poverty of pro-poor expenditure 
and total social expenditure during the 1999-2002 period of Bolivian economic 
recession. Observed characteristics of recession are simulated by the combined 
effects of negative terms of trade shock, reduction in foreign saving flows and low 
output growth. Evaluation is performed by simulating the impacts of shocks and 
social expenditures in an environment of low growth: i) on macro aggregates of 
consumption, income, saving and prices (based on a simple static 1-2-3 model built 
with 1998 data as the base year), ii) on household income and consumption levels 
by quintiles and areas, and iii) on consumption based poverty indicators by areas. 
The following were main results from experiments: 
 
The terms of trade shock had greater negative impact on household income then 
reduction in foreign saving flows. In contrast, reduction in foreign saving flows had 
greater negative impact on household consumption then the terms of trade shock. 
Poverty measured by the head count ratio has been greater from reduction in 
foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock. Poverty measured by the 
poverty gap and poverty intensity has concentrated in rural areas, being greater 
from reduction in foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock. 
 
Under macroeconomic stability (no shocks and 1998 macro conditions) social 
expenditure policy for poverty reduction would have had an important positive 
impact on household income and consumption levels (more so in income then 
consumption), in reducing the number of poor (more in urban then rural areas), 
and in reducing poverty gap and poverty intensity (more so in rural areas). 
However, social expenditure policy does not promote the production of tradables. 
 
The combined positive effects from observed social expenditure policy and effort in 
an environment of low output growth, did not compensate the combined negative 
impacts from the experienced terms of trade shock and reduction in foreign saving 
flows. 
 
These conclusions show that under macroeconomic disequilibrium poverty reduction 
efforts become policies of poverty containment or safety net programs. Poverty 
reduction is a long term objective that requires long term commitment for an 
environment on macroeconomic stability. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper develops a simple static model that connects a small open economy 
framework to the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy. The main objective is to 
evaluate the short term impacts on poverty of pro-poor expenditure and total social 
expenditure more generally, during the 1999-2002 period of economic recession. 
Secondary objectives are to establish: 1) the degree and channels through which 
external shocks impact poverty reduction efforts, 2) the degree and channels 
through which stabilization policy complement and/or conflict with poverty 
reduction efforts, and 3) identify main lines of recommendations for public policy. 
An implicit objective is to evaluate performance of the market led model, built since 
1985, in poverty reduction under shocks and recession. 
 
What are the connections between the macro economy, shocks and poverty 
reduction? As a consequence of shocks to the economy, the decrease in growth and 
aggregate consumption, saving and investment, expressed in changes in overall 
prices, wages and profits, will have an impact on welfare expressed in changes in 
household income, consumption and overall poverty and its structure. 
 
A starting idea was that poverty reduction is a long term objective that requires a 
long term commitment for an environment on macroeconomic stability. Poverty 
reduction efforts and policy will have its full impact in poverty reduction instead of 
poverty containment only if the macro environment is stable. Moreover, a higher 
degree of economic instability could generate economic forces that reduce overall 
welfare with greater impact on poor. 
 
A model of the 1-2-3 type with 1998 as base year is developed for the 
macroeconomic aspects and the introduction of shocks and pro-poor expenditure 
policy. Household income, consumption and poverty indicators to evaluate the 
impact of shocks and expenditure policy are based on 1999 household data. The 
reason for divergence in base years between the macro model and household data 
is that the MECOVI survey, designed to study poverty, began in 1999. 
 
Besides this introductory section, the second section describes some key features of 
recent Bolivian macroeconomic performance in order to identify main shocks 
experienced during the period of economic recession. Also establish their magnitude 
as well as the magnitude of poverty reduction effort in terms of expenditure. The 
third section presents the macro model (static, simple and flexible of the 1-2-3 
type) with structure and parameters that best represent the Bolivian economy in 
1998. This year is selected as the base year because it is the one just before the 
beginning of economic recession and because it is the last year of high growth 
performance accomplished by the market led model that resulted from structural 
reforms since 1985. That is 1998 represents the accumulated economic conditions 
and model momentum with which shocks were faced. Based on 1999 household 
survey data, the fourth section presents household income and expenditure level 
and structure, as well as poverty indicators accomplished by the market led model. 
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The fifth section connects the macro model to household data through aggregate 
income and consumption. This connection is used to evaluate the impacts of shocks 
and poverty reduction policy on household welfare and poverty. First, 
macroeconomic impacts from shocks and poverty reduction policy are simulated in 
order to generate changes in aggregate income and consumption. Second, these 
changes are used together with household data to simulate the effect of shocks and 
policy on household income and consumption levels by quintiles and areas, and also 
their effect in terms of changes in poverty indicators by areas. Conclusions and 
policy implications are presented in the last section. 
 
II. Recent performance of the Bolivian economy 
 
Bolivian efforts for economic development can be summarized in the first structural 
reform of 1985-89 aimed at stabilization and market liberalization policies, and the 
second structural reform of 1994-97 based on privatization and regulation policies. 
Among the most important implications of structural reforms is the construction of 
a market led growth model where the government’s roll is primarily concentrated in 
social expenditure and regulation.  Bolivian efforts in poverty reduction in particular 
can be summarized in the Bolivian strategy for poverty reduction (PRSP, 2001) 
originally based on the distribution of HIPC resources, but later amplified to the 
concept of pro-poor expenditure which began much earlier during the 90’s (UDAPE, 
2003). Our computations (presented later in detail) show that 41.4% of Bolivian 
households were poor in 1999, 23.7% in urban areas and 71.5% in rural areas. 
  
The following figures provide a brief review of performance of the Bolivian 
economy. Figure 1 shows that structural reforms had a positive impact on economic 
growth allowing growth rates up to just above 5% until 1998. During this period a 
common expression was that Bolivia needed much higher growth rates in order to 
have some significant effect on poverty reduction (UDAPE, 1993). 
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Then at the beginning of 1999 the economy experienced a sudden stop and entered 
a period of recession and slow recovery until today1. Finally a growth rate just 
above 3% during the first semester of 2004 may be the awaited indication that 
recovery is to stay and speed up. Figure 2 shows that the growth period also had a 
positive impact in the open unemployment rate which by 1997 was at it lowest of 
3.65% in urban areas and 0.25% in rural areas. From 1999 on, the open 
unemployment rate has grown continuously even showing a disconnection with 
initial economic recovery. The reason for this is that economic recovery is largely 
explained by new oil and natural gas exports, a sector that is not employment 
intensive. Although government had additional income from oil and gas rents, these 
have not prevented a fiscal deficit of 9% of GDP by 2002 and could not prevent a 
contractionary fiscal policy due to a significant net drop in government income, 
caused by recession, against rigid government expenditures. 
 
As a consequence the impact of growth on poverty is expected to have reversed 
after 1999. At the same time, greater pro-poor expenditure under the Bolivian 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) and greater social expenditure more generally is 
expected to have helped with poverty containment. However, one can not help to 
wonder how the Bolivian economy could have evolved if macroeconomic stability 
was maintained, together with a 5% growth and current poverty reduction 
resources. One can not help to ask what happened in early 1999 that changed the 
Bolivian growth path and history. One answer is the accumulation of several events 
in a moment in time when the key second structural reforms where only beginning 
to take hold. What were those events? 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bolivia has followed a pattern similar to that 
observed throughout Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac, 2004). After reaching 
its highest level and sudden stop in 1999 (see Figure 3), the following years FDI 
drops back to its early levels, having a large impact on total investment, 
particularly by 2003. However, total investment (public and private) reached its 
highest in 1998 and its drop in 1999 is explained by the sudden stop of private 
domestic investment2. 
 
FDI was expected to diminish as “capitalized” firms fulfilled their investments 
commitments3, however it was also expected that these firms would continue 
investing given an environment of economic stability and market led growth, as 
well as induce the increase in domestic private investment. These were key 
assumptions for the consolidation of a private led market oriented economy in 
Bolivia. When the time came, the economic environment had deteriorated due to 
external and internal factors. 
                                                 
1 Inflation during the decade was at an average of 7.5% and at an average of 2.5% during the period of recession. 
The nominal depreciation rate was at an average of 7.1% during the decade and at 6.8% during recession. 
2 Private domestic investment was approximated by subtracting public investment and FDI from the economy’s 
gross fixed capital formation plus inventory variations. 
3 Under traditional privatization the government transfers majority ownership of a state-owned firm to the private 
sector and has freedom over how to spend the proceeds. Under “capitalization” the government transfers 50% of a 
company’s shares to the investor with the winning bid, who takes over management and commits to invest within a 
specific time period the amount it offered to acquire its 50% in development of the firm. 
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Contraction in economic activity and aggregate demand can also be observed from 
the behavior of the banking system (see Figure 4). By 1998 the system reached its 
highest level of activity, in 1999 it experienced a sudden stop and even decreased, 
then the following years show a substantial drop in assets (largely loans) and 
liabilities (largely deposits) toward their early levels. The drop in liabilities is 
explained by important deposit withdrawals due to an environment of higher risk 
and uncertainty that resulted from economic contraction accompanied by a 
deteriorated social environment, this last being a main source of internal shock4. 
Part of those withdrawals may have left the economy as capital flight, an event that 
has also been observed throughout Latin America during this period. 
 
Figure 5 shows the large drop experienced in the bilateral exchange rate with Brazil 
in 1999 and later in the bilateral exchange rate with Argentina in 2002. However, 
the multilateral real effective exchange rate (REER) shows that real depreciations in 
the bilateral exchange rate with other countries, particularly the United States with 
whom Bolivia has its largest trade, has somewhat helped in compensating those 
drops. 
 
Figure 6 presents the evolution of the value of exports in million $us in its three 
global categories. It shows a decreasing tendency in exports of primary minerals 
and metals, with a drop also in 1999 but its lowest level in 2001. This is explained 
by the long term decreasing tendency of international prices of Bolivian mineral 
exports. It also shows 1999 as the year of lowest exports of oil and natural gas. 
Natural gas exports to Argentina ended in early 1999 and later in the same year 
began natural gas exports to Brazil. Although non-traditional exports presents a 
                                                 
4 Social and political instability resulted in changing expectations and the perception of higher risk, although the 
degree of this correlation has not been established. Some sense of the magnitude of this shock was best expressed by 
Gamarra (2003): “The threshold moment defined as a significant period in which the essence of political relations 
changed, probably peaked in the year 2000. The 2002 elections merely capped a longer process that is ongoing and 
which could culminate a very different Bolivia then the one prior to 2000.” Gamarra also identified five overriding 
and interrelated sources of conflict: “i)…..the end of pacted democracy…..; ii) …..the collapse of Bolivia’s so called 
neoliberal development strategy…..; iii)….. calls for a new land reform and for an end to land reconcentration; iv) 
increasing public insecurity nationally…..; v) an array of issues related to the coca and cocaine industry.” 
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general tendency to increase and contribute to diversification of Bolivian exports, in 
1999 those exports also experienced a slow down compared to previous two or 
three years. 
 
Figure 5             Figure 6 
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How did the above affect the balance of payments? Table 1 shows that although the 
capital account (foreign saving flows) compensated for traditional current account 
deficit, its flow levels had decreased substantially after 1998. Between 1998-2002, 
the capital account decreased by 55% explained by the combined effect from 66% 
decrease in FDI, 117% decrease in net private capital and almost three fold 
increase in new net government debt. 
 
Table 1 
Balance of payments (million $us) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003(p) 
Current account -666.9 -488.5 -446.45 -273.95 -352.03 35.74 
    Goods, services and rent -1007.3 -874.4 -833.23 -670.06 -721.5 -405.36 
    Unilateral transfers 340.4 385.9 386.78 396.11 369.47 441.1 
Capital account 1268.46 924.9 461.99 445.65 699.73 103.81 
    Foreign direct investment 1023.44 1008 733.9 703.3 674.1 194.9 
    Net government debt 104.3 113.5 110.49 202.65 304.18 391.8 
    Net private capital 229.1 -128.6 -430.5 -430.2 -268.1 -404 
    Other -88.38 -68.0 48.1 -30.1 -10.45 -78.89 
Error & omissions -476.38 -409.85 -54.04 -209 -640.4 -62.23 
Balance 125.18 26.55 -38.5 -37.3 -292.7 77.32 
    Source: UDAPE 
 
By 1998 the market led growth model helped the government concentrate half of 
its spending in social expenditure in general (Figure 7) and pro-poor expenditure in 
particular (15.63% and 10.2% of GDP by 1998 respectively). Figure 8 shows that 
pro-poor expenditure has been increasing during economic recession, reaching its 
highest level so far by 2002 (13.1% of GDP), with the characteristic that current 
expenditure has been greater then capital expenditure. As Figure 9 shows, this was 
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accomplished in a period were government income (Yg) decreased due to 
recession, generating a fiscal deficit of 9% of GDP by 2002 (DF) and forcing 
contraction of government’s current spending (GCg) in general but not of 
government investment (Ig). 
 
          Figure 7           Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
Government budget in % of GDP
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      Source: UDAPE 
 
Pro-poor expenditure includes total current and capital expenses on education, 
health, rural development, housing and sanitation. Social expenditure includes, in 
addition to pro-poor expenditure, pension payments and contributions, university 
transfers and “benemeritos”. Its financing comes from government income, mostly 
for current expenses, and from foreign credit and donations, HIPC resources and 
the National Compensation Program, mostly for capital expenses. 
 
A question is whether pro-poor expenditure or more generally social expenditure 
has been able to compensate welfare losses caused by shocks to the economy. Who 
in society were affected the most and by what magnitude. What would have been 
the magnitude of welfare gains if the economy did not experience external and 
internal shocks. These are among the question this paper tries to answer strictly 
during the period of economic recession. The market led model that is put to a test 
during this period must be evaluated with a longer vision, which is not done here. 
However, here we can mention some of the latest papers that evaluate its 
performance. 
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Based on a general equilibrium model, Thiele and Wiebelt (2003) conclude that 
Bolivian economic growth for the period 1985-99 cannot be called pro-poor, 
because it bypassed traditional agriculture and the urban informal sector where 
most of the poor earn their living. They also conclude that the goals of the Bolivian 
poverty reduction strategy can be reached only under optimistic assumptions, its 
performance fall short of expectations once external shocks are taken into account 
(such as El Niño). The evolution of poverty is likely to remain uneven, with 
considerable improvements in urban areas and a high degree of persistence in rural 
areas. The differentiated impact of the growth process on household income, 
observed for Bolivia, is likely to be the rule rather then the exception. 
 
Barja and Urquiola (2003) and Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (2004) conclude that 
privatization in infrastructure sectors (telecommunications, electricity and water 
services) has improved net consumer welfare in main urban areas (with larger 
impact on the lower income quintiles). Based on regression analysis they show that 
welfare gains occurred because greater access to services has outweighed welfare 
loses from some price increases. Based on administrative data they conclude that 
infrastructure sectors (including the oil and gas industry) had gain in internal 
efficiency and investment and by large the oil and gas industry attracted most of 
foreign investment and also generated the greatest prospect for future growth. 
However, privatization was oversold in the employment and household income 
front, particularly beyond main urban areas, and has been rejected by the majority 
of population by the perception that its benefits had reached the few. 
 
Based on administrative data, Garron, Capra and Machicado (2003) show that while 
privatization did not have significant impact on profitability, it increased operating 
efficiency, reduced employment at the firm level and decreased fixed assets. Based 
on regression analysis they show that privatization itself has been a significant 
factor in explaining the improvement of operating efficiency. Other significant 
factors are the size of firms, the presence of regulation and quality of management. 
 
Based on a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model, Jemio y Wiebelt (2003) 
conclude that Bolivia is highly vulnerable to external shocks in the form of 
decreasing world prices of exports and decreasing foreign direct investment and 
portfolio flows. Moreover, the spontaneous adjustment is severely restricted due to 
limited possibilities of substitution in the markets of goods and factors, as well as 
institutional restrictions about portfolio alternatives. Structural characteristics of the 
economy also affect the outcome of anti-shock policies. An expansionary fiscal 
policy is not feasible due to its negative impact to the balance of payments and 
fiscal equilibrium. In contrast, a nominal depreciation of the Boliviano does increase 
growth and employment, and also improves the fiscal and external balance. Despite 
structural rigidities, a nominal depreciation does generate a real depreciation 
sufficiently strong to stimulate the necessary resource reallocation for an effective 
adjustment. Regarding the poverty reduction efforts, they conclude that the 
combination of foreign debt relief (HIPC II initiative) with a fiscal expansion does 
generate greater rates of growth, lesser fiscal and external disequilibrium and 
lesser unemployment. 
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Based on regression analysis with household survey data, Andersen (2003) uses 
the determinants of education gap to show very low social mobility in Bolivia. Low 
social mobility helps explain poverty persistence over time and may be due to 
inadequate public education, corruption, marriage selectivity, insufficient rural-
urban migration and labor market imperfections. 
 
The Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2001) represents the initial 
government policy in this front and has as main premise that poverty, inequity and 
social exclusion are the most severe problems that affect democracy and 
governance in Bolivia. The strategy was originally funded on HIPC II resources, 
distributed to Bolivian 314 municipalities based on criteria defined on the National 
Dialogue (2000), and who in turn invest in social projects. Based on administrative 
data, the latest government evaluation of the strategy (UDAPE, 2003) reveals 
several internal and external sources of funding besides HIPC II and introduces a 
pro-poor expenditure measurement which was traced back to 1995. Evaluation of 
the strategy already suggests change in its vision, from a strictly social assistance 
to the poor view to an employment and income generation view through 
investment in small producer projects. 
 
III. A simple macro model 
 
1. Analytical framework 
 
The analytical framework of the 1-2-3 model (extended version with government 
and investment5) is presented in Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1990), 
Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1993), Devarajan et al (1997) and Devarajan and 
Go (2000). A brief description is presented here and in Annex I. 
 
This model refers to a single country with a small open economy that produces two 
goods: a non-traded domestic good D and an export good E. From the consumption 
point of view, the country consumes an import good M, which is not produced in the 
economy, and the domestic one.  Some of its basic characteristics and assumptions 
are the following: 
 
• The model has four actors: a producer, a household, the government and the 
rest of the world. 
• It is a static model for a given growth rate of the economy with no 
intertemporal elements. 
• The model identifies an equilibrium relationship between the real exchange 
rate and the balance of trade, which is fixed exogenously. 
• The model contains no monetary elements and any solution to the system 
depends only on relative prices (it is a “real” model). 
                                                 
5 The extended version adopted in the current study (based on Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson, 1990 and Devarajan 
et al 1997), includes government revenues and expenditures, savings, and investment, in order to consider policy 
instruments that are used to adjust macroeconomic imbalances. 
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• The model takes the two factors of production (capital and labor) as 
constant, and it doesn’t consider any imported or domestic intermediate 
goods. 
• The domestic and export goods are imperfect substitutes. 
• The output of the domestic good is an imperfect substitute for imports in 
consumption. 
• World prices of exports and imports are fixed exogenously (small country 
assumption equivalent to price takers). 
• Aggregate production is fixed, which is equivalent to assuming full 
employment of all primary factor inputs. 
 
The model can be summarized in the following simple programming model (without 
government), where a consumer utility function or absorption is maximized, which 
is equivalent to maximize social welfare, subject to: i) a technology constraint that 
represents the maximum combination of output, given a fixed proportion of 
production factors (production possibility frontier); ii) a balance of trade constraint 
that is determined exogenously; and iii) a market clearing condition for the 
domestic good “D”. 
 
Maximize ( ) ( )ηηη ωω /11A),( qq −−− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+= DqDS DMDMQ  
Subject to: ( ) XDE St ≤⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+
ρρρ θθ /11A tt  
    pwm M - pwe E ≤ B  
                     DD ≤ DS  
 
2. An application to Bolivia 
 
a. Elasticity estimation 
 
Table I.1 in Annex I presents the first order conditions of consumer utility 
maximization (equation 4) and producer profit maximization (equation 3). Both 
equations represent long term relationships among the variables of interest, which 
include the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of transformation. Both 
elasticities were estimated for the Bolivian case based on quarterly data for the 
period 1990:01-2004:02. Annex II presents the methodology, strategy and 
econometric procedure followed for elasticity estimation. The estimated co 
integrating equations are the following: 
 
CES Model: log(M/D) = (-1.61 – 0.004 t – 0.37 dcrisis) - 0.81 log(PM/PD) + Res2 
 
CET Model: log(E/D) = (-1.38 + 0.01 t - 0.18 dcrisis) + 0.248 log(PE/PD) + Res1 
 
The CES model result suggests on average an elasticity of substitution of 0.81 in 
the consumption of the import good relative to the domestic good when there is a 
change in their relative prices. Its negative sign is consistent with theory. The CET 
model result suggests on average an elasticity of substitution of 0.248 in the 
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production of the export good relative to the domestic good when there is a change 
in their relative prices. Its positive sign is consistent with theory. 
 
b. Base year national accounts data 
 
Table 2 presents the social account matrix or income flows (nominal flows) among 
actors in the Bolivian economy, expressed in million Bs. and Table 3 presents the 
same accounts with greater detail in several accounts. 
 
Table 2 
Social account matrix for the 1-2-3 Model, 1998 
Expenditures 
Receipts 
  
Commodit
y Producer Household
Governmen
t Capital World Total 
Commodity     35,144  6,658  11,053    52,855  
Producer 37,599          9,223  46,822  
Household   40,297    3,053   726  44,075  
Governmen
t 687  6,528  2,920        10,135  
Capital     6,012  69    4,661  10,742  
World 14,569            14,569  
Total 52,855  46,825  44,075  9,780  11,053  14,610    
Source: Author own computations. 
Each cell represents a payment from a column account to a recipient in a row account. 
 
Table 3 
Basic macroeconomic data for the 1-2-3 Model, 1998 
Acounts
Millions
of Bs.
Output=1 Acounts
Millions
of Bs.
Output=1
 Output (Value Added) 40.297 1,00 Total Revenue 14.235 0,35
  Wages 15.278 0,38   NonTax 4.784 0,12
Current Expenditure 13.290 0,33
GDP at  market prices 46.822 1,16   Goods & Services 8.443 0,21
  Private Consumption 35.144 0,87   Financial expenditures 932 0,02
  Public Consumption 6.658 0,17   Transfers (tr) 3.053 0,08
  Investment 11.053 0,27   Other current expenditures 863 0,02
  Exports 9.223 0,23 Capital Expenditure 2.712 0,07
  Imports 15.256 0,38 Fiscal Balance -1.767 -0,04
 
  Sales & Excise Tax 5.811 0,1442 Exports - Imports -4.661 -0,12
  Import Tariffs 720 0,02 Net Profits & Dividends 216 0,01
  Export Duties 0 0,00 Interest Payments -1.111 -0,03
  Payroll Tax 0 0,00 Net Private Transfers (remittances) 726 0,02
  Personal Income Tax 202 0,01 Net Official Transfers (grants) 1.152 0,03
  Capital Income Tax 2.718 0,07 Current Account Balance -3.678 -0,09
Total 9.451 0,23
External Debt 25.668 0,64
Debt   Service Payments 2.019 0,05
National Accounts
Tax Revenue
Fiscal Account
Balance of Payments
 
  Source: Author own computations. 
 
c. Base year model 
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Table 4 presents the estimated parameters for the CET and CES elasticities, from 
which the ρ and η parameters are computed. Based on those parameters and the 
1998 output data, the scale and share parameters are also computed, which is the 
calibration procedure used in the model. Table 5 presents the base year 1998 data 
for the exogenous and endogenous variables of the model. Table 6 shows the initial 
values for all the equilibrium conditions in the model. 
 
Table 4 
Parameters and calibration 
Parameters Formulas Value 
Elasticity for CET  (Ω)  0.25 
Elasticity for CES (σ)  0.81 
Scale for CET (At) X/( θt*E^(ρ)+(1-θt)*D
s^(ρ) )^(1/ρ) 3.26 
Share for CET (θt) 1/( 1+(P
d/Pe)*(E/Ds)^(ρ-1) ) 0.99 
Rho for CET (ρ) (1/Ω) + 1 5.03 
Scale for CES (Aq) Q
s/(ωq*M^(-η)+(1-ωq)*DD^(-η) )^(-1/η) 1.88 
Share for CES (ωq) ( (P
m/Pd)*(M/DD)^(1+η) )/( 1+ (Pm/Pd)*(M/DD)^(1+η) ) 0.31 
Nu for CES (η) (1/σ) -1 0.23 
 Source: Author own computations based on Devarajan’s et al model. See Annex I for more details. 
 
Table 5 
Base year values for the endogenous and exogenous variables 
Exogenous Variables 
Base 
Year Endogenous Variables 
Base 
Year 
World Price of Imports (pwm) 0.95 Export Good (E) 0.23 
World Price of Exports (pwe) 1.00 Import Good (M) 0.40 
   Supply of Domestic Good (DS) 0.77 
Import Tariffs (tm) 0.05 Demand of Domestic Good (DD) 0.77 
Export Duties (te) 0.00 Supply of Composite Good (QS) 1.17 
Indirect Taxes (ts) 0.12 Demand of Composite Good (QD) 1.17 
Direct Taxes (ty)  0.07    
   Tax Revenue (T) 0.23 
Savings rate (sy) 0.14 Total Income (Y) 1.09 
Govt. Consumption (G) 0.15 Aggregate Savings (S) 0.27 
Govt. Transfers (tr) 0.08 Consumption (C) 0.78 
Foreign Grants (ft) 0.03    
Net Priv  Remittances (re) 0.02 Import Price (Pm) 1.00 
Foreign Saving (B) 0.10 Export Price (Pe) 1.00 
Output (X) 1.00 Sales Price (Pt) 1.12 
   Price of Supply (Pq) 1.00 
   Price of Output (Px) 1.00 
    Price of Dom. Good (Pd) 1.00 
   Exchange Rate (R) 1.00 
      
   Investment (Z) 0.24 
   Government Savings (Sg) 0.02 
    Walras Law (Z-S) 0.00 
Source: Author own computations. See Annex I for more details on model and notation. 
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Table 6 
Equations, equilibrium conditions and base year values 
Real Flows Formula Value 
CET  Transformation At*(θt*E^(ρ)+(1-θt)*Ds^(ρ))^(1/ρ) 1.00 
Supply of Goods Aq*(ωq*M^(-η)+(1-ωq)*Dd^(-η))^(-1/η) 1.17 
Domestic Demand Cn+Z+G 1.17 
E/D Ratio ( (Pe/Pd)/( θt/(1-θt)) )^(1/(ρ-1)) 0.30 
M/D Ratio ( (Pd/Pm)*(ωq/(1-ωq)) )^(1/(1+η)) 0.51 
Nominal Flows Formula  
Revenue Equation tm*pwm*R*M + te*Pe*E + ts*Pq*Qd + ty*Y 0.23 
Total Income Equation Px*X+ tr*Pq + re*R 1.09 
 Savings Equation sy*Y+R*B+Sg 0.27 
Consumption Function Y*(1-ty-sy)/Pt 0.78 
Prices Formula  
Import Price Equation R*pwm*(1+tm) 1.00 
Export Price Equation R*pwe/(1+te) 1.00 
Sales Price Equation Pq*(1+ts) 1.12 
Output Price Equation (Pe*E+Pd*Ds)/X 1.00 
Supply Price Equation (Pm*M+Pd*Dd)/Qs 1.00 
Numeraire 1.00 1.00 
Equilibrium Conditions Formula  
Domestic Good Market Dd - Ds 0.00 
Composite Good Market Qd –Qs 0.00 
Current Account  Balance pwm*M - pwe*E -ft – re 0.10 
Government Budget Tax - G*Pt – tr*Pq + ft*R 0.02 
Source: Author own calculations based on Devarajan’s et al model. See Annex I for more details. 
 
 
IV. Evaluating household welfare and poverty 
 
1. Analytical framework 
 
Sen (1976) describes two properties of good poverty indicators, named 
monotonicity and transfer axioms. Kakwani (1980) proposed a third property 
named transfer sensitivity axiom to obtain decomposable indicators. Table 7 
summarizes the three axioms and their interpretation. 
 
Table 7 
Properties of poverty indicators 
Axiom Interpretation 
Monotonicity 
 
 
 
Transfer 
 
 
 
 
Transfer sensitivity 
A reduction in the welfare variable (consumption or income) of a poor 
household must increase the poverty measure. Ceteris paribus other 
things. 
 
A pure transfer of income (or consumption) from a poor household to 
any other household that is richer must increase the poverty measure. 
Ceteris paribus other things. 
 
If a transfer (t > 0) takes place from a poor household with income or 
consumption yi to a poor household with income or consumption yi + d 
(d > 0), then the magnitude of increase in poverty must be smaller for 
larger yi. Ceteris paribus other things. 
Source: Based on Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). 
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Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) developed a parametric family of poverty 
measures that satisfy the three axioms, as follows: 
 
∑
=
≤−=
N
i
i
i zx
z
x
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1
)(I)1(1 αα  
  
Where x = (x1, x2,…, xN) is a vector of a welfare variable (household income or 
consumption), N the total population, z the poverty line (z >0) that represents the 
cost of a basket of basic needs, α is a positive parameter which represents societal 
aversion to poverty, and I is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the 
welfare variable is less than the poverty line (xi ≤ z) and 0 otherwise. 
 
When α = 0 the indicator is named Headcount Ratio (P0), it is the number of poor 
people measured as the fraction of population below the poverty line. When α = 1 
the indicator is named Poverty Gap (P1), which considers differences between poor 
people by measuring the distance existing between income or consumption and the 
threshold. According to Deaton (1997), the contribution of individual i to aggregate 
poverty is larger the poorer is i. P1 can also be interpreted as a per capita measure 
of the total shortfall of individual welfare levels below the poverty line; it is the sum 
of all the shortfalls divided by the population and expressed as a ratio of the 
poverty line itself. P1 will be increased by transfers from poor to non poor (second 
axiom), or from poor to less poor who thereby become non poor. When α =2 the 
indicator is named Severity of Poverty (P2) or also FGT (by the initials of the 
authors) and is a weighted sum of income shortfalls of the poor people. P2 is a 
sensitive indicator to the distributions among the poor (third axiom). 
 
Computation of poverty indicators Pα, require selection of a welfare variable 
(household income or consumption) and definition of a poverty line. Regarding the 
welfare variable, there are differences between selecting household income or 
household consumption. The income view is that of learning about the purchase 
capacity of a household in obtaining the goods and services that will satisfy their 
basic needs or not, it is an ex ante interpretation of welfare, with the characteristic 
that volatility of income over time may also produce volatility of welfare indicators. 
The consumption view is that of learning about the actual household purchase of 
the goods and services that satisfy or not their basic needs, it is an ex post 
interpretation of welfare, and tends to remain relatively stable over time. In this 
study both income and consumption structures will be computed, although the 
poverty indicators themselves are based on consumption solely. 
 
Regarding the poverty line and following the World Bank (1993), the objective is to 
define an income or consumption level that is sufficient to purchase the minimum 
standard of nutrition and other necessities, also referred to as a basket of basic 
needs with food and non-food components. Following the World Bank (2003), the 
operational steps to define poverty lines are: 
 
(i) Adopt a nutritional requirement for good health, such as 2,100 
Calories per person per day. 
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(ii) Estimate the cost of meeting the food energy requirement or food 
component (zfood), using a diet that reflects the habits of households 
located near the poverty line (e.g. those in the lowest, or second-
lowest, quintile of the income distribution; or those consuming 
between 2,000 and 2,200 Calories). 
(iii) Add a non-food component (z non food). The most current practice uses 
the Orshansky coefficient defined as the reciprocal of average food 
share, also named Engel’s coefficient. 
(iv) Then the basic needs poverty line is given by: 
 
foodnonfoodneedsbasic zzz +=  
 
This study adopts the poverty line computed by UDAPSO (1995). 
 
Once the poverty indicators Pα are computed and in order to make welfare 
comparisons between households, it is important to consider their differences in 
size and composition. Medina (2002) explains that the equivalence scales are 
indexes that measure the relative cost of living considering different sizes and 
compositions of households. These are composed by the consumer unit equivalence 
and economies of scale, the first considers needs of the household members 
according to their characteristics and the second reflects the reduction in the 
marginal cost with additional household members. 
 
Following the World Bank (2003) the solution to the welfare comparison problem is 
to apply a system of weights, named Adult Equivalent Scale (AES). For a household 
of any given size and composed by adults and children, an equivalence scale 
measures typically the number of adult males which that household is deemed to 
be equivalent to. Consequently, each member of the household counts as some 
fraction of an adult male and the household size is the sum of these fractions of 
adult equivalents. This study uses the AES computed by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), recommended by the World Bank 
(2003), and defined as: 
 
childrenadultsAES 5.0)1(7.01 +−+=  
 
The equation reflects a parametric scale as function of the relative needs of the 
household members. Interpreting its functional form, AES has a value of 1 with the 
first adult, every additional adult is equivalent to 0.7 of the first adult, and each 
child is equivalent to 0.5 of the first adult. 
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2. An application to Bolivia 
 
a. The Bolivian household survey 
 
The National Institute of Statistics (INE) collects data from households since 1999 
under the MECOVI Program6. The living conditions surveys have national coverage 
with independent and cross-sectional samples every year. The 1999 survey used in 
this study has a sample size of 3000 households. 
 
The main objective of the MECOVI surveys is to generate information on the living 
conditions and poverty of households. The questionnaire is designed to produce 
detailed income and expenditures data to allow computation of monetary welfare 
indicators. In addition, the questionnaire includes education, health, employment, 
housing and basic services modules, allowing computation of non-monetary welfare 
indicators. In general, the data allows for the analysis of poverty over time and its 
distribution across households, as well as the computation of indicators of the 
extent and severity of poverty. 
 
b. Computation of aggregate consumption 
 
The food module in the MECOVI survey questionnaire, distinguishes between food 
consumed inside the households and food consumed outside the households.  In 
the first case, households consume food purchased in markets, obtained by self-
production and received from other households or persons (called other sources in 
the questionnaire). In the second case, consumption outside the household 
corresponds to elaborated food consumed individually by household members (e.g. 
dinners). To compute the total consumption of food, all items declared were 
standardized to monthly consumption and then aggregated considering purchases, 
self-production and other sources. 
 
Regarding non-food items, the MECOVI-household-survey registers a wide range of 
information (e.g. education, health, water, phone, etc) some of which is excluded 
for not corresponding to the welfare definition or consumption concept. In the 
filtering process, all expenditures that are not frequent like legal fees, home repairs 
and improvements, taxes, expenditures on social ceremonies (e.g. marriages, 
births, etc.) are dropped, based on the explanation given by Deaton and Zaidi 
(2002) that expenditures on taxes and levies are not part of consumption, and 
should not be included. Furthermore, all purchases of financial assets, as well as 
amortization of debt and interest payments are also excluded from aggregate 
consumption. Two other items not included are gifts and transfers, given their 
inclusion in the household that acts as a recipient. Finally, some special items like 
health expenditures (e.g. hospital and medicines) are also excluded, because they 
do not reflect an increase in welfare since households expend money on them only 
in the event that a member gets sick or injured. 
 
                                                 
6 The MECOVI Household Survey implemented by INE received financial and technical support from the World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean.  
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Table 8 summarizes computation of aggregate consumption and its structure. In 
1999 Bolivia had 1.85 million households, 62.7% in urban areas and 37.3% in rural 
areas, reflecting the relative importance of urbanization in the country7. Aggregate 
consumption in urban areas was 2.96 times greater than in rural areas, showing an 
important difference between geographical areas. 
 
The ratio of food consumption inside the household with respect to the total 
consumption represents 46% in urban areas and 70% in rural areas. Education, 
housing and non food expenditures in urban areas are greater than rural areas, 
reflecting better access to services and markets in urban areas. 
 
Table 8 
Consumption of households by geographical areas, 1999 
(Bolivianos per month) 
Description Urban Rural Bolivia
Food consuption inside the household 940.9 482.7 771.1
Food consuption outside the household 197.5 36.9 138.0
Non Food Expenditures 365.7 100.7 267.5
Education Expenditures 302.1 46.1 207.2
Housing expenditures 222.0 18.7 146.6
Total Consumption 2,028.2 685.1 1,530.4
Number of households 1,163,084 691,656 1,854,740  
       Source: Author own computation based on MECOVI 99. 
 
 
Table 9 further disaggregates the structure of consumption by quintiles and areas. 
At the national level, the consumption of the richest quintile is 11.6 times greater 
than the poorest quintile; 9.6 in urban areas and 10.1 in rural areas.   
 
Engel’s law (the share of food consumption decreases in richest households) is 
evidenced inside the urban and rural areas. Comparing the first four quintiles, there 
are small differences in the structure of consumption, but the last quintile presents 
bigger expenditures in non food and education expenditures. Differences on 
extreme quintiles show inequality and polarized characteristic of consumption in 
Bolivia.  
 
Curiously, the share of housing expenditure in the poorest households is too high in 
urban areas; this may reflect efforts of the poorest households to access basic 
services (e.g. water, electric energy). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 INE defines urban as those cities with populations greater then 2000. This definition has been criticized in that it 
may underestimate the weigh of rural areas. 
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Table 9 
Structure of consumption of households by quintiles, 1999 
1 
(poorest)
2 3 4 5 
(richest)
Total
Food consuption inside the household 63% 61% 58% 52% 40% 46%
Food consuption outside the household 5% 8% 8% 10% 10% 10%
Non Food Expenditures 10% 13% 14% 16% 21% 18%
Education Expenditures 6% 7% 9% 13% 18% 15%
Housing expenditures 16% 12% 10% 10% 11% 11%
Total Consumption (Bs per month) 365.8 737.5 1,182.1 1,794.5 3,515.4 2,028.2
Food consuption inside the household 76% 71% 71% 66% 62% 70%
Food consuption outside the household 3% 6% 5% 7% 7% 5%
Non Food Expenditures 12% 15% 14% 16% 18% 15%
Education Expenditures 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 7%
Housing expenditures 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 3%
Total Consumption (Bs per month) 293.9 689.6 1,156.6 1,761.9 2,963.2 685.1
Food consuption inside the household 75% 67% 61% 53% 41% 50%
Food consuption outside the household 4% 6% 8% 10% 10% 9%
Non Food Expenditures 12% 14% 14% 16% 21% 17%
Education Expenditures 6% 7% 8% 12% 18% 14%
Housing expenditures 4% 6% 9% 9% 11% 10%
Total Consumption (Bs per month) 300.8 709.1 1,175.9 1,790.4 3,494.5 1,530.4
Urban
Rural
Bolivia
Description
Quintiles of  consumption
 
        Source: Author own calculation based on MECOVI 99 
 
 
c. Computation of the aggregate income 
 
Income is one of the most important variables in the household economy; it 
provides the resources to finance current consumption and savings. Total household 
income is the sum of resources received by factor and non factor sources, 
representing the total purchasing power of a household in a given time period. 
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The income structure of Bolivian’s household survey is as follows: 
 
Figure 8 
Income structure of household survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 is the computed structure of household labor and non labor income by 
quintiles, where aggregate labor income from primary and secondary sources was 
computed without extraordinary income8. Primary work is the most important 
source of labor income in urban and rural areas, with increasing importance for the 
higher income quintiles. Secondary work is a relatively more important source of 
labor income in rural areas, while non labor income from rents and transfers are 
relatively more important in urban areas, particularly for the lower income quintiles. 
 
                                                 
8 Labor income that is not received periodically, but occasionally. It is not considered to avoid overestimation of 
disposable income. 
Labor
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 25
Table 10 
Structure of household income by quintiles, 1999 
Quintiles of  income 
Description 1 
 (poorest) 
2 3 4 5 
(richest) 
Total 
Urban 
Labor 54% 79% 82% 85% 87% 86% 
Primary work 53% 76% 81% 82% 82% 81% 
Secondary work 1% 3% 2% 3% 6% 5% 
Non labor 46% 21% 18% 15% 13% 14% 
Rents 14% 9% 8% 7% 9% 8% 
Transfers 32% 12% 10% 8% 4% 6% 
Total (Bs. per month) 77 449 927 1,721 4,656 2,147 
Rural 
Labor 86% 89% 92% 90% 94% 91% 
Primary work 78% 77% 77% 81% 84% 79% 
Secondary work 8% 11% 14% 9% 10% 11% 
Non labor 15% 12% 9% 10% 9% 10% 
Rents 0% 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 
Transfers 13% 9% 5% 7% 2% 6% 
Total (Bs. per month) 73 390 878 1,661 3,787 505 
Bolivia 
Labor 83% 85% 85% 86% 88% 87% 
Primary work 75% 77% 80% 82% 82% 81% 
Secondary work 7% 8% 6% 4% 6% 6% 
Non labor 17% 15% 15% 14% 12% 13% 
Rents 2% 5% 6% 7% 9% 8% 
Transfers 15% 11% 8% 7% 4% 6% 
Total (Bs. per month) 74 412 911 1,709 4,600 1,415 
   Source: Author own computation based on MECOVI 1999. 
 
 
d. Poverty indicators 
 
Table 11 presents the computed poverty indicators. The adjusted 
headcount ratio at the national level indicates that 41.4% of Bolivian households 
were poor in 1999, that is, they consume under the poverty line. This indicator 
changes dramatically when comparing urban (23.7%) with rural areas (71.5%). As 
a reference the urban poverty line is 328.1 bolivianos per capita monthly (54.4 
$us), the rural poverty line is 233.6 bolivianos per capita monthly (40.1 $us) and 
the national poverty line is 293.1 bolivianos per capita monthly (50.4 $us). 
 
The adjusted poverty gap at the national level indicates that the poor households 
have a mean shortfall of 39.8% of poverty line value and require on average an 
additional per capita consumption of 116.5 bolivianos per month to overcome their 
poverty condition. This indicator also shows large differences when comparing the 
depth of poverty between urban (24.6%) with rural areas (48.4%). 
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The adjusted intensity or severity of poverty at the national level indicates an 
average of 37.8% degree of inequality among poor households. The severity of 
poverty is greater in rural areas than urban areas, reflecting less inequality 
between poor people in urban areas and more in rural areas. 
 
Table 11 
Poverty indicators based on consumption, 1999 
Description
Head count 
ratio (P0)
Poverty gap 
(P1)
Intensity 
(P2)
Per capita 
consumption (Bs 
by month)
Urban 47.6% 15.9% 7.1% 435.9
Rural 84.6% 48.8% 32.6% 141.0
 
Bolivia 61.3% 28.1% 16.6% 326.6
Urban 23.7% 24.6% 25.6% 602.2
Rural 71.5% 48.4% 44.7% 200.0
 
Bolivia 41.4% 39.8% 37.8% 453.1
Without adjustment
Adjusted by Adult Equivalence Scale
 
Source: Author own computations based on MECOVI 1999 
Urban poverty line: 328.1 bolivianos per capita monthly 
Rural poverty line 233.6  bolivianos per capita monthly 
National poverty line 293.1 bolivianos per capita monthly 
 
 
It is important to notice that these computations differ from official indicators for 
three reasons: 
 
(i) The official welfare indicator is a mix of income (in urban areas) and 
consumption (in rural areas). This may not be a better conceptual 
definition since income and consumption have different implications. 
(ii) INE’s definition of consumption includes health expenditures and 
estimations of durable goods. In the case of durable goods, the primary 
source of information is not consistent and has a subjective basis. 
(iii) The official welfare indicator is not adjusted by Adult Equivalence Scales. 
 
Comparing results of Table 11, the national adjusted Head count ratio is smaller in 
19.9% compared to the unadjusted indicator. The AES adjustment has a notably 
effect especially in poorest and households of big size. Considering the other two 
indicators, the adjustment allows increases of about 20% at the national level in 
the poverty gap and intensity indicators. The poverty gap is deeper in urban areas 
then was originally thought with the unadjusted measure; however, the unadjusted 
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measure did well in rural areas. Also inequality among the poor is greater in urban 
and rural areas then was originally thought with the unadjusted measure. 
 
Comparisons of the distribution of aggregate consumption reveal the effect of the 
adjustment in per capita consumption (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8 
Effect of AES in Per capita consumption (pcc) 
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   Source: Author own calculations. 
   ppc is per capita consumption (Bs. per month). 
   ppc_aes is per capita consumption adjusted by adult equivalence scale. 
   The vertical line is z. 
 
 
V. Impact of shocks on household welfare 
 
This chapter is developed in two sections; first the 1-2-3 Model is used to simulate 
shocks to the economy in order to generate information on changes in prices and 
income. Second, the information on changes in prices and income is then used 
together with the household data to generate changes in poverty indicators as well 
as changes in income and expenditures by quintiles. 
 
The objective is to simulate what happened in the 1998-2002 period, with 1998 
being the base year and 1999-2002 as the second period which will be compared to 
the base year (comparative statics). Given that 1998 was the year of highest 
growth with a correspondent level of welfare accomplished, then the second period 
would be of loss of welfare, which we want to measure in terms of poverty 
indicators as well as in changes in income and expenditure. 
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1. Limitations 
 
There are several limitations to this analysis and methodology that must be 
mentioned: 
 
• Pro-poor government expenditure in education, health and infrastructure for 
development will have its full returns in terms of poverty reduction only in 
the long run. Therefore what we measure here is only the short run effects of 
government expenditures, believing that these expenditures will have a short 
run effect on overall household income and expenditures. 
 
• Given that the distribution of income and consumption by quintiles is based 
on a fixed year (1999), which are applied to overall changes in household 
income and consumption, then this methodology cannot simulate the more 
complicated process of income and consumption redistribution. 
 
• Given that the 1-2-3 model is built on highly aggregate macroeconomic data, 
then this model cannot simulate the more complicated process of resource 
distribution by economic sectors and its consequent effects on household 
income and expenditures. 
 
• Given the simplicity of the 1-2-3 model, its static nature does not allow for 
more complicated recursive and dynamic effects within the macro 
connections and less so between the macro and household connections. 
 
2. Experiments and macro outcomes 
 
In this section it is of interest to determine the direction and order of magnitude of 
impact of shocks and pro-poor expenditure policy on the macro economy. The 
analysis has the following sequence: 
 
• Impact from a terms of trade shock alone; 
• Impact from a reduction in foreign saving alone; 
• Impact from an increase in total social expenditure alone; 
• Impact from an increase in pro-poor expenditure alone; 
• Impact from output growth alone; 
• Impact from all of the above cases simultaneously, except pro-poor 
expenditure which is part of total social expenditure. 
 
The first external shock considered is a drop in the terms of trade. The Bolivian 
trade data shows that the economy experienced a 7% drop in its export price index 
and a 1% drop in the import price index during 1998-2002. The combined effect 
produces a 6% drop in the terms of trade. The terms of trade are capturing not 
only the effect of price drops due demand contraction of Bolivian exports but also 
the price effects of exchange rate crisis in neighbouring countries. 
 
The second external shock considered is a decrease in foreign saving. The Bolivian 
balance of payments data shows that the capital account has decreased in 45% 
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during 1999-2002 compared to 1998. This is explained by three accounts, i) FDI 
flows dropped 34.1% during that period, generating a 28% decrease in the capital 
account balance compared to 1998, ii) net government foreign debt flows have 
increased by 191% during that period, generating a 15% increase in the capital 
account compared to 1998, iii) other net private capital has reversed during that 
period generating a capital flight of 3.17 times the positive flow of 1998, generating 
a 40% decrease in the capital account compared to 1998. 
 
The measurement of pro-poor expenditure came as a result of the need to evaluate 
the BPRS. These expenditures are part of total social expenditures and part of 
overall government expenditures. Pro-poor expenditures data show that these have 
increased in total by 153.06 million $us during 1999-2002 and by 107.36 million 
$us in its capital component, representing a 17.7% and 31.2% increase compared 
to 1998 respectively. In the 1-2-3 model this was introduced as an increment of 
government consumption by 12.7% and an increment of foreign grants by 51.4% 
respectively. Total social expenditures data show that these have increased in total 
by 250.5 million $us during 1999-2002 and by 108.7 million $us in its capital 
component, representing an 18.8% and 31.8% increase compared to 1998 
respectively. In the 1-2-3 model this was introduced as an increment of 
government consumption by 20.7% and an increment of foreign grants by 52% 
respectively. 
 
As seen in Figure 1, GDP has grown an average of 1.74% during 1999-2002; this 
lower growth rate was introduced in the model as an increase in output by 1.74%. 
Finally all cases of shocks, expenditure policy and low growth were simulated 
simultaneously to determine the direction and magnitude of their net effect on 
macro variables. 
 
Table 12 presents the macroeconomic outcome from all simulations in terms of the 
model’s endogenous variables. The first column is the starting situation in 1998 or 
base year. The second column is the macro outcome from the terms of trade shock 
alone. The third column is the macro outcome from a reduction in foreign saving 
flows alone. The fourth and fifth columns are the macro outcome from expenditure 
policy, pro-poor and total social. The sixth column is the macro outcome from 
output growth alone and the final column is the macro outcome from the net impact 
of the combined terms of trade, foreign saving reduction and output growth 
simultaneously. 
 
The full impact of the terms of trade shock results in a 1.5% decrease in 
consumption and a 5.5% decrease in total income compared to the base year. Also 
a 5.1% decrease in tax revenues and 4% decrease in aggregate savings, implying 
that without these last two happening, consumption would have decreased further. 
There is no observed change in investment. However, the drop of the domestic 
good price relative to the price of the export good and import good results in a 
0.13% increase in the production and consumption of the domestic good, a 0.4% 
decrease in exports and 3.3% decrease in imports. 
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Table 12 
Macro outcome from shocks and expenditure policy 
Endogenous Variables Base 
Terms 
of trade 
Foreign 
 saving 
Pro-poor 
expenditure 
Social 
expenditure 
Output 
growth 
All 
cases 
              
Export Good (E) 0.229 0.228 0.235 0.227 0.227 0.233 0.237 
Import Good (M) 0.396 0.383 0.354 0.410 0.410 0.402 0.358 
Supply of Domestic Good (Ds) 0.771 0.772 0.765 0.773 0.773 0.784 0.781 
Demand of Domestic Good (Dd) 0.771 0.772 0.765 0.773 0.773 0.784 0.781 
Supply of Composite Good (Qs) 1.168 1.154 1.117 1.183 1.183 1.186 1.136 
Demand of Composite Good (Qd) 1.168 1.154 1.117 1.183 1.183 1.186 1.136 
        
Tax Revenue (Tax) 0.234 0.222 0.208 0.243 0.243 0.237 0.207 
Total Income (Y) 1.093 1.033 0.993 1.125 1.126 1.107 0.977 
Aggregate Savings (S) 0.274 0.263 0.208 0.274 0.261 0.280 0.193 
Consumption (Cn) 0.776 0.764 0.769 0.779 0.779 0.789 0.769 
        
Import Price (Pm) 0.999 0.989 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.989 
Export Price (Pe) 0.999 0.932 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.932 
Sales Price (Pt) 1.122 1.079 1.031 1.152 1.152 1.119 1.012 
Price of Supply (Pq) 0.999 0.960 0.917 1.025 1.025 1.996 0.901 
Price of Output (Px) 0.999 0.943 0.906 1.030 1.030 1.996 0.876 
Price of Dom. Good (Pd) 0.999 0.946 0.877 1.039 1.039 0.995 0.859 
Exchange Rate (Er) 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
        
Investment (Z) 0.244 0.244 0.202 0.238 0.226 0.250 0.189 
Government Savings (Sg) 0.022 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.004 0.026 0.003 
Walras Law (Z-S) 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Source: Author own computations. 
 
 
The full impact of foreign savings flow reduction results in a 0.9% decrease in 
consumption and a 9.1% decrease in total income compared to the base year. Also 
an 11.1% decrease in tax revenues and 24.1% decrease in aggregate savings, 
implying that without these last two happening, consumption would have decreased 
further. There is also a 17.2% decrease in investment. However, the drop of the 
export good price relative to the domestic and the drop of the domestic good price 
relative to the price of the import good results in a 0.77% decrease in the 
production and consumption of the domestic good, a 2.62% increase in exports and 
10.6% decrease in imports. 
 
The full impact of social expenditure policy results in a 0.38% increase in 
consumption and a 3% increase in total income compared to the base year. Also a 
3.8% increase in tax revenues, 4.7% decrease in aggregate savings and a 7.4% 
decrease in investment. In the case of pro-poor expenditure alone there are some 
slight differences in that income increases a bit less, aggregate savings don’t 
change and investment decreases less. However, in both cases the increase of the 
domestic good price relative to the price of the export good and import good results 
in a 0.2% increase in the production and consumption of the domestic good, a 
0.8% decrease in exports and 3.5% increase in imports. This last result shows that 
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pro-poor expenditure and social expenditure in general conflicts with policies that 
promote exports and import substitution, that is, conflicts with policies that 
promote the production of tradables. 
 
The full impact of output growth results in a 1.7% increase in consumption and 
1.3% increase in total income compared to the base year. Also a 1.3% increase in 
tax revenues, 2.2% increase in aggregate savings and 2.4% increase in 
investment. There is a drop of the domestic good price relative to the price of the 
export good and import good, however output growth increased production of the 
domestic and exports goods as well as demand of the import good, although with 
some differences. It results in a 1.7% increase in the production and consumption 
of the domestic good, 1.7% increase in exports and 1.5% increase in imports. 
 
Finally, the full impact of the combined effect of all cases simultaneously results in 
a 0.9% decrease in consumption and 10.6% decrease in total income compared to 
the base year. Also an 11.5% decrease in tax revenues and 29.5% decrease in 
aggregate savings, implying that without these two happening, consumption would 
have decreased further. There is also 22.5% decrease in investment. However, the 
drop of the domestic good price relative to the price of the export good and import 
good results in a 1.3% increase in the production and consumption of the domestic 
good, a 3.5% increase in exports and 9.6% decrease in imports. 
 
A first conclusion is that under macroeconomic stability (no shocks and 1998 macro 
conditions) social expenditure policy would have had an important positive impact 
first on aggregate income and second on aggregate consumption and tax revenues, 
but negative impact on savings, investment and production of tradables. 
 
A second conclusion is that the combined positive effects from social expenditure 
policy and low output growth on aggregate consumption, income and savings did 
not compensate the negative impacts from the combined terms of trade shock and 
reduction in foreign saving flows. 
 
3. Experiments and poverty outcomes 
 
The connection between the simple macro model and household welfare evaluation 
is based on the idea proposed by Devarajan and Go (2002) although it is not 
applied literally9. With the information on changes in income (wages and profits) 
and prices of the three goods given by the macro model, together with initial levels 
of labor income and commodity consumption given by the household surveys, the 
impact of shocks and macro policies on household welfare can now be computed. 
 
Aggregate consumption includes various items of food consumption and non-food 
consumption. Given that the definition of export (E), import (M) and domestic (D) 
                                                 
9 Households maximize an indirect utility function (v), which is a function of wages (w), profits (п) and prices (p). 
This indirect utility function is obtained from utility maximization as a function of net labor supply of households L 
and net commodity demand C, subject to the restriction that profits are the residual of commodity consumption 
expenditure pC minus labor income w:  v = v(w, п, p) and dv/(∂v/∂π) = wL(dw/w) + dπ – pC(dp/p). 
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goods have their origin in the input-output matrix, all items in the MECOVI survey 
were codified according to its respective row of the IOM. This procedure allows 
computing the household expenditure in terms of domestic and import goods, and 
gives the possibility to connect simulations of the 1-2-3 model (with changes in 
prices of the domestic and import goods) to each household, showing the effects on 
consumption after changes in these prices. 
 
Table 13 shows the linking codes between items of consumption and the Input-
Output matrix rows. 
 
Table 13 
Links between consumption and the input-output matrix (in percent) 
Quintiles of  consumption 
Description 1 
poorest 
2 3 4 5  
richest 
Total 
Urban 
Expenditure in Domestic goods (D) 97 96 95 93 90 92 
Expenditure in Imported goods (M) 3 4 5 7 10 8 
Total Consumption (Bs month) 437 926 1,333 1,839 3,240 2,016 
Rural 
Expenditure in Domestic goods (D) 96 94 94 92 92 94 
Expenditure in Imported goods (M) 4 6 6 8 8 6 
Total Consumption (Bs month) 339 760 1,081 1,625 2,532 684 
Bolivia 
Expenditure in Domestic goods (D) 96 95 95 93 90 93 
Expenditure in Imported goods (M) 4 5 5 7 10 7 
Total Consumption (Bs month) 346 828 1,280 1,811 3,217 1,522 
Source: Author own calculations. 
 
 
The specific connection between the macro model and the household surveys is 
done through the use of an income multiplier and an expenditure multiplier. The 
income multiplier is simply the percent change in total income directly obtained 
from the simple macro model, but introduced to households only through labor 
income. The expenditure multiplier has two components, the expenditure multiplier 
for the domestic good (GHd) and the expenditure multiplier for the import good 
(GHm). Each of these components was computed the following way: 
 
GHd02 = Pd02 Qd02 = (Pd98 + ∆Pd98-02) (Qd98 + ∆Qd98-02) 
  = Pd98 Qd98 + Pd98 ∆Pd98-02 + ∆Pd98-02 Qd98 + ∆Pd98-02 ∆Qd98-02 
Multiplier for d = GHd02/ GHd98 
 
GHm02 = Pm02 Qm02 = (Pm98 + ∆Pm98-02) (Qm98 + ∆Qm98-02) 
   = Pm98 Qm98 + Pm98 ∆Pm98-02 + ∆Pm98-02 Qm98 + ∆Pm98-02 ∆Qm98-02 
Multiplier for m = GHm02/ GHm98 
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Where Pd and Pm are prices of the domestic good and import good respectively, 
obtained from the macro model. Qd and Qm are the quantities of the domestic and 
the import good respectively, also obtained from the macro model. 
 
Table 14 shows the impact of shocks, expenditure policy and growth on household 
income and consumption by areas (Tables III.2 to III.6 in Annex III show impact by 
quintiles). In the case of the terms of trade shock, people experiment loss of 
income by 4.8% nationally and loss of consumption by 5.3% nationally, and by 
similar percentages in both urban and rural areas. For the case of decreasing 
foreign saving flows, people experiment loss of income by 0.6% nationally and loss 
of consumption by 12.8% nationally, and by similar percentages in both urban and 
rural areas. Absolute losses of income and consumption are increasing the higher 
the income quintile and greater in urban areas, however, that is not necessarily the 
case in relative terms, for both negative shocks. 
 
Table 14 
Impacts on household income and consumption (Bs per capita per month) 
  Income Consumption Change in 
Quintile Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
Terms of trade shock 
Urban 670.5 638.2 598.1 566.4 -32.3 -31.6 
Rural 146.6 139.3 199.5 189.0 -7.3 -10.6 
Total 476.3 453.3 450.4 426.5 -23.1 -23.8 
Reduction in foreign saving flows 
Urban 670.5 666.4 598.1 521.6 -4.1 -76.4 
Rural 146.6 145.7 199.5 173.9 -0.9 -25.6 
Total 476.3 473.4 450.4 392.8 -2.9 -57.6 
Social expenditure policy 
Urban 670.5 744.5 598.1 622.4 74.1 24.4 
Rural 146.6 163.3 199.5 207.7 16.7 8.2 
Total 476.3 529.1 450.4 468.7 52.8 18.4 
Output growth 
Urban 670.5 733.4 598.1 605.1 62.9 7.1 
Rural 146.6 160.8 199.5 201.9 14.2 2.4 
Total 476.3 521.2 450.4 455.7 44.8 5.3 
All cases 
Urban 670.5 657.0 598.1 520.9 -13.5 -77.1 
Rural 146.6 143.5 199.5 173.7 -3.1 -25.8 
Total 476.3 466.7 450.4 392.2 -9.6 -58.1 
Source: Author own computations (See Tables III.2 to III.6 in Annex III). 
 
In the case of social expenditure policy, people experiment gains in income by 11% 
nationally and gains in consumption by 4% nationally, and by similar percentages 
in both urban and rural areas. For the case of output growth, people experiment 
gains in income by 9.4% nationally and gains in consumption by 1.2% nationally, 
and by similar percentages in both urban and rural areas. Absolute gains of income 
and consumption are increasing the higher the income quintile and greater in urban 
areas, however, that is not necessarily the case in relative terms, for both positive 
shocks. 
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The combined impact of shocks, social expenditure policy and growth shows that 
people have experimented loss of income by 2% nationally and loss of consumption 
by 12.9% nationally, and with similar percentages in both urban and rural areas. 
Absolute losses of income and consumption have increased the higher the income 
quintile and greater in urban areas, although that is not necessarily the case in 
relative terms. 
 
One first conclusion from these experiments comes from comparing the magnitudes 
of the differential effects on household income and consumption levels by quintiles 
and areas. The negative effect on income has been greater from the terms of trade 
shock and the negative effect consumption has been greater from reduction in 
foreign saving flows. 
 
A second conclusion is that under macroeconomic stability (no shocks and 1998 
macro conditions), social expenditure policy would have had an important positive 
impact first on household income and second on household consumption by 
quintiles and areas. 
 
A third conclusion is positive effects from the combined social expenditure policy 
and low output growth on income and consumption, did not compensate the 
negative impacts from the combined terms of trade shock and foreign saving 
reduction. 
 
Table 15 shows the impact of shocks, expenditure policy and low growth on poverty 
measures expressed in the FGT indicators. The terms of trade shock increases the 
number of poor by an average of 1.1% points nationally, more in urban areas then 
in rural areas. Poverty gap decreases nationally by 0.2% points and poverty 
intensity decreases nationally by 0.1% points. The negative change of the poverty 
gap and poverty intensity percentages nationally is explained by the effect of the 
new poor, who would usually be the ones that were just above the poverty line and 
who would require less additional income to recover its previous welfare position. 
By areas the poverty gap and poverty intensity decreases in urban areas but 
increases in rural areas. 
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Table 15: Change in FGT Poverty Indicators (in percent) 
Change in 
 
Head Count 
(P0) 
Poverty Gap 
(P1) 
Intensity 
(P2) P0 P1 P2 
Base year 
Urban 
s.e. 
23.8 
(0.019) 
24.6 
 
  9.6 
    
Rural 
s.e. 
71.5 
(0.032) 
48.5 
 
29.1 
    
Total 
s.e. 
41.4 
(0.021) 
39.9 
 
22.0 
       
Terms of trade shock 
Urban 
s.e. 
F 
25.0 
(0.019) 
12.0 
24.4 
 
 
9.5 
 
 
1.2 
 
 
-0.2 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
Rural 
s.e. 
F 
72.3 
(0.031) 
5.48 
48.6 
 
 
29.3 
 
 
0.8 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
Total 
s.e. 
F 
42.5 
(0.021) 
17.34 
39.7 
 
 
22.0 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
-0.2 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
Decrease in foreign saving flows 
Urban 
s.e. 
F 
27.3 
(0.020) 
36.95 
25.1 
 
 
  9.8 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
Rural 
s.e. 
F 
74.6 
(0.029) 
14.78 
49.0 
 
 
29.8 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
Total 
s.e. 
F 
44.8 
(0.020) 
50.89 
39.8 
 
 
22.1 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
Social expenditure policy 
Urban 
s.e. 
F 
22.7 
(0.018) 
8.97 
24.6 
 
 
9.5 
 
 
-1.1 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
Rural 
s.e. 
F 
71.0 
(0.033) 
8.53 
48.0 
 
 
28.7 
 
 
-0.5 
 
 
-0.5 
 
 
-0.4 
 
 
Total 
s.e. 
F 
40.6 
(0.020) 
13.49 
39.8 
 
 
21.9 
 
 
-0.9 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
Output growth 
Urban 
s.e. 
F 
22.7 
(0.018) 
8.97 
24.6 
 
 
9.5 
 
 
-1.1 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
Rural 
s.e. 
F 
71.0 
(0.033) 
8.53 
48.0 
 
 
28.6 
 
 
-0.5 
 
 
-0.5 
 
 
-0.4 
 
 
Total 
s.e. 
F 
40.6 
(0.020) 
13.49 
39.7 
 
 
21.9 
 
 
-0.9 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
-0.1 
 
 
All cases 
Urban 
s.e. 
F 
26.2 
(0.020) 
26.3 
24.8 
 
 
9.7 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
Rural 
s.e. 
F 
73.5 
(0.030) 
13.07 
48.9 
 
 
29.6 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
Total 
s.e. 
F 
43.7 
(0.020) 
39.36 
39.8 
 
 
22.1 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
     Notes: s.e. is standard errors and F-Statistics are for the null that current and base year values are equal. 
     In all cases this hypothesis is rejected at less then 1%. The testing procedure is explained in Annex III. 
    Source: Author own computations. 
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The foreign saving flow reduction increases the number of poor by an average of 
3.4% points nationally, more in urban areas then in rural areas. Poverty gap 
decreases nationally by 0.1% points and poverty intensity increases nationally by 
0.1% points. The negative change in the poverty gap percent nationally is again 
explained by the characteristics of the new poor. However, the poverty gap and 
poverty intensity increases in both urban and rural areas when calculating them 
separately, more so in rural areas in both cases.  
 
The social expenditure policy decreases the number of poor by an average of 0.9% 
points nationally, more in urban areas (1.1% points) then in rural areas (0.5% 
points). The poverty gap and poverty intensity would also decrease nationally by 
0.1% points, explained fully by their decrease in rural areas. 
 
Similarly, the low output growth decreases the number of poor by an average of 
0.9% points nationally, more in urban areas (1.1% points) then in rural areas 
(0.5% points). The poverty gap and poverty intensity would also decrease 
nationally by 0.1% points, mostly explained by its decrease in rural areas in the 
first case and explained fully by its decrease in rural areas in the second case. 
 
The combined effect of shock, expenditure policy and low output growth have 
increased the number of poor by an average of 2.3% points nationally, more in 
urban areas (2.4% points) then in rural areas (2% points). The combined effect 
does not show an effect on the poverty gap when measured nationally, but it shows 
an increase in urban and rural areas when measured separately, more so in rural 
areas (0.4% points) then in urban areas (0.2% points). The combined effect shows 
an increase in poverty intensity by 0.1% points nationally and also by areas, more 
so in rural areas (0.5% points) then in urban areas (0.1% points). 
 
A first conclusion is that poverty increases, measured by the head count ratio, has 
been greater from reduction in foreign savings flows then from the terms of trade 
shock. Poverty increases, measured by the poverty gap and poverty intensity is 
concentrated in rural areas, and has been greater from the impact of reduction in 
foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock. 
 
A second conclusion is that under macroeconomic stability social expenditure policy 
would have had an important impact in reducing the number of poor nationally, 
more in urban areas then in rural areas. It would have also reduce the poverty gap 
and poverty intensity in both areas, although more so in rural areas. 
 
A third conclusion is that the combined positive effects from poverty reduction 
through social expenditure policy in an environment of low output growth, did not 
compensate the negative impacts on all measures of poverty from the combined 
terms of trade shock and reduction in foreign saving flows. 
 
A fourth conclusion is that under individual or combined shocks, effects tend to be 
greater on the head count poverty measure then on the poverty gap and poverty 
intensity measures. Although in part this may be due to methodological limitations, 
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it could also be due to the structural characteristics of income and consumption 
distribution. 
 
Given the diverse characteristics of the Bolivian population, captured by the 1999 
survey, we can know which groups were impacted the most and by what 
magnitude. This information is presented in Table 16 based on the combined effects 
of shocks, expenditure policy and low growth on poverty. The number of poor 
increased the most in the age group of 19-30 nationally and in urban areas. In rural 
areas the most affected were in the age group of 31-45. In terms of sex, the 
number of poor increased the most among males, nationally and in both urban and 
rural areas. 
 
When analyzing the increase in the number of poor by ethnicity, the classified as 
Spanish were impacted the most nationally and secondly the Aymara and Quechua 
equally. In rural areas the most affected were also the classified as Spanish and 
secondly the classified as “other”. In urban areas the number of poor increased the 
most among the Aymara and secondly among the Quechua and Spanish. By self-
identification, the number of poor increased the most under the classification of 
“none” Quechua or Aymara, nationally and in urban areas, being second the self-
identified as “other” and Aymara. In contrast, in rural areas the number of poor 
increased the most under the self-identification of “other”. 
 
In terms of education, first those with incomplete primary education were affected 
the most nationally and in urban areas, increasing the number of poor. Second was 
the population with complete or incomplete secondary education. In rural areas the 
number of poor increased the most first among those with an incomplete secondary 
education and second among those with complete or incomplete primary education. 
 
In terms of employment, the number of poor increased the most among the 
unemployed nationally and in rural areas, secondly the inactive and those not in 
working age (PENT). In the case of rural areas the number of poor increased by 
15.4% points among the unemployed. In urban areas the number of poor increased 
the most first among the inactive and second among all other employment 
classification equally. 
 
By economic activity, the number of poor increased the most in the industry sector, 
nationally and in both urban and rural areas. By economic condition and by sector, 
the number of poor increased the most in the classification of “house” (house 
work), nationally and in urban areas. In rural areas, the number of poor increased 
the most when “independent” and when “formal” or “informal”. 
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Table 16 
Poverty profile by geographical area (head count ratio in percent) 
 Base year All cases Difference 
 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Age group          
Less18 28.5 73.4 46.7 30.9 75.7 49.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 
19-30 20.9 67.0 32.2 23.7 68.9 34.8 2.8 1.9 2.6 
31-45 19.1 67.4 34.9 21.2 70.2 37.3 2.1 2.8 2.3 
45-64 20.1 71.0 41.0 22.7 71.8 42.8 2.5 0.8 1.8 
>=65 16.9 73.8 47.4 18.2 75.2 48.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Sex          
Male 23.8 70.3 41.2 26.3 72.5 43.6 2.6 2.2 2.4 
Female 23.7 72.6 41.7 26.1 74.4 43.8 2.3 1.8 2.1 
Ethnicity          
Quechua 34.8 79.9 69.5 37.2 81.8 71.5 2.4 1.8 2.0 
Aymara 39.3 84.3 66.7 43.8 84.7 68.7 4.5 0.4 2.0 
Spanish 20.0 48.3 24.9 22.3 51.7 27.4 2.3 3.4 2.5 
Other 59.4 73.4 68.5 59.4 75.5 69.8 0.0 2.0 1.3 
Self-identification          
Quechua 26.6 76.7 55.0 28.1 78.5 56.7 1.5 1.8 1.7 
Aymara 32.0 77.9 51.6 34.9 78.3 53.4 2.9 0.4 1.8 
None 25.8 56.0 35.7 29.2 57.6 38.5 3.4 1.6 2.8 
Other 15.7 45.2 20.2 18.0 48.7 22.7 2.3 3.5 2.5 
Education          
None 36.6 81.7 66.8 38.5 82.7 68.2 1.9 1.0 1.3 
Incomplete Primary 30.0 70.0 48.0 33.2 72.5 50.8 3.2 2.5 2.8 
Complete Primary 23.0 52.9 31.1 24.4 54.8 32.7 1.4 2.0 1.6 
Incomplete Secondary 20.6 51.1 25.3 22.9 54.7 27.9 2.3 3.6 2.5 
Complete Secondary 15.5 48.7 18.1 17.9 49.2 20.5 2.5 0.5 2.3 
Professional, Technical 6.3 17.9 6.8 7.9 18.9 8.4 1.6 1.0 1.6 
Migrant condition          
Non-migrant 23.9 77.9 46.0 26.6 79.6 48.2 2.6 1.8 2.3 
Migrant 23.5 55.9 33.3 25.6 58.5 35.6 2.1 2.6 2.3 
Employment          
PENT 30.3 75.5 50.5 32.6 78.1 52.9 2.3 2.6 2.4 
Employed 21.0 71.5 43.5 23.3 73.0 45.4 2.3 1.4 1.9 
Unemployed 26.6 56.6 28.0 28.9 72.0 30.9 2.3 15.4 2.9 
Inactive 22.4 62.3 30.1 25.1 65.1 32.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 
Economic Activity          
Primary sector 45.0 75.8 73.9 47.0 77.0 75.1 2.0 1.1 1.2 
Industry 30.5 61.8 34.6 33.2 66.7 37.6 2.7 4.9 3.0 
Services 15.5 29.8 16.7 17.6 32.6 18.9 2.1 2.8 2.2 
Condition          
Dependent 20.2 44.8 23.7 22.4 46.2 25.8 2.2 1.4 2.1 
Independent 20.8 70.3 43.7 23.2 72.2 45.9 2.4 1.9 2.2 
Employer 8.4 45.3 15.7 8.4 45.3 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Unpaid 33.0 79.2 70.4 35.7 80.3 71.8 2.7 1.1 1.4 
House 17.6 25.7 18.6 22.0 25.7 22.4 4.3 0.0 3.8 
Sector          
Formal 14.0 34.9 16.7 15.8 36.4 18.6 1.9 1.5 1.8 
Informal 24.9 74.3 51.6 27.3 75.7 53.5 2.4 1.5 1.9 
House 17.6 25.7 18.6 22.0 25.7 22.4 4.3 0.0 3.8 
Source: Author own computation 
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VI. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Shocks and poverty reduction policy were analyzed individually and jointly in an 
environment of low growth in an effort to simulate the actual experience of the 
Bolivian economy during the period 1999-2002. The analytical method was based in 
the connection of a simple macro model of the 1-2-3 type with household data 
(Devarajan and Go, 2002). Analysis was made in terms of the direction and order 
of magnitude of the differential effects of shocks and policy on i) macro aggregate 
consumption, income, saving and prices, ii) on income and consumption levels of 
households, and iii) on poverty measures. 
 
The following are some conclusions and implications: 
 
1. The terms of trade shock experienced by the Bolivian economy had a greater 
negative impact on household income then the experienced reduction in foreign 
saving flows. At the same time, reduction in foreign saving flows had greater 
negative impact on household consumption then the terms of trade shock. 
 
2. Poverty increase measured by the head count ratio has been greater from 
reduction in foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock. Poverty 
increase measured by the poverty gap and poverty intensity has concentrated in 
rural areas, and has also being greater from reduction in foreign saving flows then 
from the terms of trade shock. 
 
3. Under macroeconomic stability (no shocks and 1998 macro conditions) social 
expenditure policy for poverty reduction would have had an important positive 
impact on aggregate income, consumption and saving, on household income and 
consumption levels (more so in income then consumption), in reducing the number 
of poor (more in urban then rural areas), and in reducing poverty gap and poverty 
intensity (more so in rural areas). 
 
4. The combined positive effects from social expenditure policy in an environment 
of low output growth, did not compensate the combined negative impacts from the 
terms of trade shock and reduction in foreign saving flows. 
 
5. Under individual or combined shocks, effects tend to be greater on the head 
count poverty measure then on the poverty gap and poverty intensity measures. 
Although in part this may be due to methodological limitations, it could also be due 
to the structural characteristics of income and consumption distribution. 
 
These conclusions show that under macroeconomic disequilibrium poverty reduction 
efforts become policies of poverty containment or safety net programs during a 
period of economic recession. They also show that if poverty reduction is seen as a 
long term objective, particularly in a country that is starting at high poverty levels, 
then commitment to long term macroeconomic stability must be a key general 
policy. It also suggests that this general policy must be accompanied by policies 
directed at ensuring positive growth under disequilibrium, given that the economy 
will certainly experiment other episodes of shocks in the medium and long term. 
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The paper also shows that the magnitude of poverty reduction effort does matter. If 
effort produces small positive effects compared to large negative effects of shocks, 
then poverty reduction policy is not real. If effort actually produces larger positive 
effects compared to negative effects of shocks, then poverty reduction policy may 
be real. However, if effort is larger, the macro analysis warns of other 
macroeconomic effects from social expenditures policies for poverty reduction, 
those of export decreases, import increases and investment decreases. 
 
Bolivia probably doesn’t have the financial resources for a greater scale poverty 
reduction effort. If this is the case, then a more effective way to avoid welfare 
losses and maximize poverty reduction is to defend macroeconomic stability. This 
implies work on preparing for external shocks and on structural aspects of the 
economy, like greater export and trade diversification and large improvements in 
domestic productivity. 
 
Some of the conclusions also suggest that the objective of poverty reduction in 
terms of the number of poor alone can not be sufficient, this should be 
accompanied by other objectives equally or more important related to the quality of 
poverty reduction. This implies work on rigid structural aspects like improvement of 
income and consumption distribution and social mobility. 
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ANNEX I 
DESCRIPTION OF THE 1-2-3 MODEL 
 
Table I.1 
Assumptions about imperfect substitution 
Assumption Function10 Maximization11 
The domestic and 
export goods are 
assumed to be 
imperfect 
substitutes. 
This imperfect substitutability is captured 
by the economy’s production possibility 
frontier, for convenience specified as a 
CET function with transformation 
elasticity Ω: 
 ( )Ω;DE,GX S=  
( ) ρρρ θθ /11A tt ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+= St DEX    (1)
Profit maximization by 
producers, given the CET 
function, yields to the first-order 
condition: 
 
( )Ω= ,, deS PPgDE  
( )1/1
)1(
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
ρ
θ
θ
d
t
e
t
S P
P
D
E   (3) 
The output of the 
domestic good is 
assumed to be an 
imperfect 
substitute for 
imports in 
consumption. 
This imperfect substitutability in 
composite commodity is given by a CES 
function with substitution elasticity σ: 
 ( )σ;DM,FQ DS =  
 
( ) ( )ηηη ωω /11A qq −−− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+= DqS DMQ   (2) 
Utility maximization by 
consumers, given the CES 
function, yields to the first-order 
condition: 
( )σ,, dmD PPfDM =  
( )
( )1/1
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q
d
q
D P
P
D
M
(4) 
       Source: Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1993) and Devarajan et al (1997) 
 
 
Aside from Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) showed in Table I.1, equation (5) is part 
of the “real flows” side of the model, which defines total demand for the composite 
good (absorption) showing that the value of the goods demanded must equal 
aggregate expenditure:  
 
                QD = C + Z + G                                                    (5) 
 
In Equation (5), C represents aggregate consumption; Z represents aggregate real 
investment and G is the real government demand. 
 
                                                 
10 The two main characteristics of the CES/CET functions are: i) they are homogeneous of degree one (linearly 
homogeneous); and ii) they have a constant elasticity of substitution. 
11 See Annex I for detailed mathematical procedure. 
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Table I.2 
Price equations in the model 
Assumption Function Dual price equations 
There is a fix 
world price for E 
(pwe) 
The domestic price of E (taking into 
account that there is no export subsidy 
rate in the Bolivian case) is determined 
by: 
 
epwR=eP                       (6) 
where R is the nominal exchange rate 
The price of the composite good 
Px (aggregate output)12 is the 
cost-function dual to the first-
order condition of equation 3. ( )dex PPgP ,1=  
Given the linearly homogeneity 
of the dual price equation and 
using Euler’s theorem, we obtain 
the following expenditure 
identity: 
X
DPEPP
Sde
x +=       (8) 
There is a fix 
world price for M 
(pwm) 
The domestic price of M (including 
import tariffs: tm) is determined by: 
 ( ) mpwR1 mm tP +=             (7) 
where R is the nominal exchange rate 
The price of the composite 
commodity13 Pq is the cost-
function dual to the first-order 
condition of equation 4. ( )dmq PPfP ,1=  
Given the linearly homogeneity 
of the dual price equation and 
using Euler’s theorem, we obtain 
the following expenditure 
identity: 
Q
DPMPP
Ddm
q +=       (9) 
        Source: Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1993) and Devarajan et al (1997) 
 
 
Complementing the information presented in Table I.2, two additional price 
equations are introduced: i) one that considers the sales price of composite goods 
Pt when indirect taxes (ts) are added to the price of the composite good (Pq); and ii) 
a numeraire price, in this case the nominal exchange rate R, since only relative 
prices matters: 
 
                  Pt = (1 + ts ) Pq                                                  (10) 
R = 1                                                           (11) 
 
                                                 
12 The composite good price Px corresponds to GDP deflator. 
13 The composite good price Pq corresponds to an aggregate consumer price or cost-of-living index. 
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Regarding the market-clearing equilibrium conditions14, supply must equal demand 
for “D” and “Q” (Equations 12 and 13 respectively), the balance-of-trade constraint 
must be satisfied adjusting grants (ft) and remittances (re) from abroad (Equation 
14), and also the government-budget constraint (public savings) must be 
considered as the residual of tax revenue (T) plus foreign grants less government 
consumption (G ) and transfers (tr) to households (Equation 15). 
 
DD - DS = 0                                                       (12) 
QD - QS = 0                                                       (13) 
pwm M - pwe E – ft – re = B                                            (14) 
Sg = T + ft R - Pt G - Pq tr                                            (15) 
 
The income flows (nominal flows) among the actors in the economy can be 
tabulated in a social account matrix (SAM) with six accounts: one for each actor, a 
“capital” account that reflects the saving-investment balance, and a “commodity” 
account that keeps track of absorption. Table I.3 presents this social account 
matrix. 
 
Table I.3 
Social account matrix for the 1-2-3 model15 
Expenditures Receipts 
Commodity Producer Household Government Capital World Total 
Commodity   C Pt Pt G  Pt Z  Pt QD16 
Producer Pt DD     R pwe E PtDD+ RpweE 
Household  Px X   tr Pq  re R Y= Px X + tr Pq+ re R 
Government tm R pwm M tsPqQD tyY    T 
Capital   syY Sg  R B  S=syY+ Sg+ R B  
World R pwm M      R pwm M 
Total Pq QS GDP+ tsPqQD Y Outflow P
q Z 
R pwe E 
+ re R + 
R B  
 
   Source: Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1990) 
 
 
Four equations can be extracted from the information presented in Table I.3; 
Equation (16) that corresponds to household income “Y” (sum of 3rd row), Equation 
(17) determining government revenue “T17” (sum of the 4th row: T = tm R pwm M + 
tS Pq QD + tyY ), Equation (18) representing total savings “S”, and finally Equation 
(19) that determines aggregate household consumption “C”. The latter can be 
obtained rearranging terms of the 3rd column18 and takes the following form: 
 
    C Pt = Y (1 - sy - ty )                                                  (19) 
 
                                                 
14 The equilibrium conditions are not all independent. To prove this, it suffices to show that the model satisfies 
Walras’s Law. 
15 Each cell represents a payment from a column account to a recipient in a row account. 
16 According to equation 5. 
17 Note that in the Bolivian economy there are no export subsidies. 
18 Note that all income is spent on the single composite good. 
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Summarizing, the full analytical model is a system of nineteen equations with 
nineteen endogenous variables. Endogenous and exogenous variables are listed 
below:  
 
Table I.4 
List of variables of the 1-2-3 model 
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables 
 
E 
M 
DS 
DD 
QS 
QD 
Pe  
Pm 
Pd 
Pt 
Px 
Pq 
R 
T 
Sg 
Y 
C 
S 
Z 
 
: Export good 
: Import good 
: Supply of domestic good 
: Demand for domestic good 
: Supply of composite good 
: Demand for composite good 
: Domestic price of export good 
: Domestic price of import good 
: Producer price of domestic good 
: Sales price of composite good 
: Price of aggregate output 
: Price of composite good 
: Nominal exchange rate 
: Tax revenue 
: Government savings 
: Total income 
: Aggregate consumption 
: Aggregate savings 
: Aggregate real investment 
 
pwm
pwe 
tm 
te 
ts 
ty 
tr 
ft 
re 
sy 
X  
G  
B  
Ω 
σ 
 
: World price of import good 
: World price of export good 
: Tariff rate 
: Export duties 
: Sales/excise/value-added tax rate 
: Direct tax rate 
: Government transfers 
: Foreign transfers to government 
: Foreign remittances to private sector 
: Average saving rate 
: Aggregate output 
: Real government demand 
: Balance of trade/Foreign savings 
: Export transformation elasticity 
: Import substitution elasticity 
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ANNEX II 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE AND ELASTICITY ESTIMATION 
 
 
1. Methodology and data source 
 
The 123 macro model divides the economy into two sectors (tradable (E+M) and 
non-tradable (D)) and three goods markets (export good E, domestic good D and 
import good M). In this economy the production possibilities frontier is specified as 
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function with transformation elasticity 
between E and Ds. Utility in consumption is specified as a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function with substitution elasticity between DD and M. 
Production and consumption decisions are determined by the relative prices of E 
and D in the first case and of M and D in the second case. Export and import prices 
are exogenous making the domestic price endogenous. 
 
The purpose of this Annex is to present the methodology, data source and 
processing, study of the statistical properties of the data and finally production of 
estimates of the constant elasticity of transformation (CET) and constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES), required for the 123 model. It is desired that estimation of 
these parameters best represent the Bolivian economy. 
 
In the CES case, utility maximization by households subject to a standard budget 
constraint can be expressed in the following form: 
 
Maximize     [ω(Mt)-η + (1-ω)(DDt)-η]-1/η 
 
Subject to:     Mt*PMt + DDt*PDt = QSt*PQt 
 
The parameter η determines the elasticity of substitution between consumption of 
the import good and consumption of the domestic good, which is given by v = 1/ 
(1+η) for -∞<η<+1, ω is the share parameter, PM is the price of the import good, 
PD is the price of the domestic good, QS*PQ is a budget constraint expressed in 
terms of the composite good and t is time. Solution of the maximization problem 
yields the following optimality condition for the allocation of consumption: 
 
Mt/DDt = [((1-ω)/ω)*(PMt/PDt)]-1/ (η+1) 
 
This condition reduces to the following log-linear testable relationship: 
 
ln (Mt/DDt) = α0 + α1 ln (PDt/PMt) where    α0 = v ln (ω/ (1- ω))   and   α1 = v 
 
In the CET case, maximization of aggregate production subject to a constant 
elasticity of transformation function can be expressed in the following form: 
 
Maximize    Et*PEt + DSt*PSt = X°t*PXt 
 
Subject to    X° = [θ (Et) ρ + (1- θ) (DSt) ρ] 1/ρ 
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The parameter ρ determines the elasticity of transformation between the production 
of the export good and the domestic good, which is given by υ = 1/ (ρ-1) for 1< ρ 
<+∞, θ is the share parameter, PE is the price of the export good, PS is the price of 
the domestic good, X°*PX is the value of aggregate product X° which is fixed. 
Solution of the maximization problem yields the following optimality condition for 
the allocation of production: 
 
Et/DSt = [((1-θ)/θ)*(PEt/PSt)] 1/ (ρ-1) 
 
This condition reduces to the following log-linear testable relationship: 
 
ln (Et/DSt) = β0 + β1 ln (PEt/PSt) where    β0 = u ln ((1-θ)/θ)   and   β1 = u 
 
Both testable relationships based on the CET and CES functions describe a long run 
equilibrium condition, therefore it is of interest to estimate a co integrating 
relationship among the variables. In the first case the elasticity corresponds to the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the production ratio and the price ratio of 
the export good relative to the domestic good. In the second case the elasticity 
corresponds to the long-run relationship between the consumption ratio and the 
price ratio of the import good relative to the domestic good. In each case the price 
ratio describes an internal real exchange rate, in the first case it is a production 
exchange rate (depreciation is an incentive for exports) and in the second it is a 
consumption exchange rate (depreciation is an incentive for imports). 
 
The source for the data is the national accounts statistics produced by the Bolivian 
National Institute of Statistics (INE). INE produces national accounts data on a 
quarterly basis and time series for all of its components are available from the first 
quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 2004 (the last two quarters are 
preliminary), in nominal and real terms (base 1990). The time series required for 
the study must be consistent with an economy that produces two goods (one 
export and one domestic) and demands two goods (one import and one domestic). 
For the elasticity of substitution in supply (CET function) we need the quarterly time 
series of the export good (EE), domestic good (DCK), price of the export good (PE) 
and price of the domestic good (PD). For the elasticity of substitution in demand 
(CES function) we need the time series of the import good (MCK), domestic good 
(DCK), price of the import good (PM) and price of the domestic good (PD). All of 
these can be obtained from the national accounts with the following processing: 
 
EE = no processing required. 
MCK = Total imports MM – intermediate imports and raw materials. 
DCK = Total household demand+total government demand+total investment–MCK. 
PE = Nominal EE / Real EE 
PM = Nominal MCK / Real MCK 
PD = Nominal DCK / Real DCK 
EE/DCK = Ratio of export good production to domestic good production. 
PE/PD = Ratio of the export good price to the domestic good price. 
MCK/DCK = Ratio of import good consumption to domestic good consumption. 
PM/PD = Ratio of the import good price to the domestic good price. 
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2. Statistical properties of the data 
 
The following figures present the raw quarterly time series of interest, where 
ED=EE/DCK is the real production ratio of the export good relative to domestic 
good, PED= PE/PD is the price ratio of the export good relative to the domestic 
good, MD=MCK/DCK is the real consumption ratio of the import good relative to the 
domestic good and PMD=PM/PD is the price ratio of the import good relative to the 
domestic good. 
 
Figure II.1     Figure II.2 
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Figure II.3      Figure II.4 
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Table II.1 presents the standard ADF test applied to the data in levels, indicating 
the variables LED=log(ED), LMD=log (MD), LPED=log (PED) and LPMD=log (PMD) 
are all non-stationary under different test specifications. Table II.2 presents the 
standard ADF test applied to the data in first difference, indicating the first 
difference of LED and LMD are stationary under different test specifications. The 
first difference of LPED is also stationary except when a constant and trend are 
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included in the test specification. The first difference of LPMD is stationary only 
when a constant is included in the test specification. 
Comparing Table II.1 and II.2 it is possible to conclude that the variables LED and 
LMD are integrated of first order or I(1). The variable LPED is not I(1) only when 
the test includes constant plus trend. The variable LPMD is I(1) only when the test 
includes a constant. 
 
Table II.1 
ADF unit root tests for the variables in levels 
Variable Specification Lag length ADF statistic Stationarity 
None 1 -0.875 Non-Stationary 
Constant 1 -1.783 Non-Stationary 
 
LED 
Constant, trend 1 -2.523 Non-Stationary 
None 4 -0.078 Non-Stationary 
Constant 4 -1.883 Non-Stationary 
 
LMD 
Constant, trend 4 -1.961 Non-Stationary 
None 5 -0.522 Non-Stationary 
Constant 5 -2.375 Non-Stationary 
 
LPED 
Constant, trend 5 -1.605 Non-Stationary 
None 10 0.577 Non-Stationary 
Constant 10 -0.435 Non-Stationary 
 
LPMD 
Constant, trend 10 -1.665 Non-Stationary 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The lag length was selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Source: Authors own calculations 
 
Table II.2 
ADF unit root tests for the variables in first difference 
Variable Specification Lag length ADF statistic Stationarity 
None 3 -4.963*** Stationary 
Constant 3 -5.122*** Stationary 
 
∆1 LED 
Constant, trend 3 -5.250*** Stationary 
None 3 -5.553*** Stationary 
Constant 3 -5.496*** Stationary 
 
∆1 LMD 
Constant, trend 3 -5.511*** Stationary 
None 4 -2.482** Stationary 
Constant 4 -2.325** Stationary 
 
∆1 LPED 
Constant, trend 4 -2.882 Non-Stationary 
None 9 -1.694* Non-Stationary 
Constant 9 -3.007** Stationary 
 
∆1 LPMD 
Constant, trend 9 -2.807 Non-Stationary 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The lag length was selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Source: Authors own calculations. 
 
Traditional unit root and co-integration tests were developed for non-seasonal or 
zero frequency data, which could also be applied to quarterly data only if it is 
proven that unit roots at other frequencies are not present (half frequency or 
biannual unit root and one fourth frequency of annual unit root). It is important to 
notice that the elasticity of interest in this study corresponds to the long run 
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equilibrium relationship between LED and LPED and between LMD and LPMD, that 
is, it is strictly a non-seasonal or zero frequency relationship in the data. 
 
Seasonal differencing is often used to remove non-stationarity in seasonal data. In 
this case the quarterly difference operator is ∆4yt=yt-yt-4. Table II.3 presents the 
ADF test applied to the quarterly difference of the data. Results show that the 
quarterly difference of LED is non-stationary under any test specification, which 
supports the result, that this variable is I(1). The quarterly differences of LMD and 
of LPED are stationary only when no deterministic variables are included in the test 
specification. The quarterly difference of LPMD is stationary only when a constant is 
included in the test specification. Stationarity of the quarterly difference implies 
that the time series may contain either a non-seasonal unit root, a biannual unit 
root, an annual unit root, or a combination of these types of unit roots. 
 
Table II.3 
ADF unit root tests for the variables in quarterly difference 
Variable Specification Lag length ADF statistic Stationarity 
None 5 -1.297 Non-Stationary 
Constant 5 -1.496 Non-Stationary 
 
∆4 LED 
Constant, trend 5 -1.686 Non-Stationary 
None 5 -2.291** Stationary 
Constant 5 -2.283 Non-Stationary 
 
∆4 LMD 
Constant, trend 5 -2.234 Non-Stationary 
None 1 -2.695*** Stationary 
Constant 1 -2.551 Non-Stationary 
 
∆4 LPED 
Constant, trend 1 -3.066 Non-Stationary 
None 6 -1.800* Non-Stationary 
Constant 6 -3.191** Stationary 
 
∆4 LPMD 
Constant, trend 6 -3.001 Non-Stationary 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The lag length was selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Source: Authors own calculations. 
 
The HEGY procedure introduced by Hylleberg et al. (1990) is appropriate to find out 
which types of unit roots are contained in the data. The quarterly difference 
operator ∆4 = (I-L4) can be decomposed as, (I-L4) = (I-L)(I+L)(I+L2) = (I-
L)(I+L+L2+L3), which has four roots, one at zero frequency, one at two cycles per 
year and two complex pairs at one cycle per year. The HEGY procedure consists in 
the following testable regression model, which can be estimated by OLS, 
 
y4t = µt + π1y1,t-1 + π2y2,t-1 + π3y3,t-2 + π4y3,t-1 + (lags of y4t) + εt 
 
where,  y1t ≡ (I+L)(I+L2)yt = yt + yt-1 + yt-2 + yt-3    
y2t ≡ -(I-L)(I+L2)yt = -(yt - yt-1 + yt-2 - yt-3)    
y3t ≡ -(I-L)(I+L)yt = -(I-L2)yt = -(yt - yt-2)    
y4t ≡ ∆4yt=yt-yt-4   
µt = constant, trend and seasonal dummies 
Lags of y4t are included to ensure white noise residuals 
εt = i.i.d. residuals. 
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Based on the HEGY regression the following hypothesis can be tested using critical 
values computed by Hylleberg et al: 
 
HA: π1=0 or non-seasonal unit root 
HB: π2=0 or biannual unit root 
HC: π3=π4=0 or annual unit root 
 
Table II.4 presents estimated statistics from application of the HEGY regression to 
the data. In the case of LED there is consistent rejection of HB and HC and failure to 
reject HA implying unit root only at zero frequency (non-seasonal unit root), that is, 
the variable must be I(1). This result supports the previous finding. 
 
Table II.4 
HEGY tests for seasonal unit roots 
Variable Variable and 
specification 
Lag 
length 
‘t’ 
π1=0 
‘t’ 
π2=0 
‘F’ 
π3= π4=0 
None 0 -1.263 -3.164**** 9.756**** 
C 0 -0.420 -3.150**** 9.568**** 
C, t 0 -1.074 -3.119**** 9.453**** 
C, q1 q2 q3 0 -0.610 -3.146** 13.666**** 
LED 
C, t, q1 q2 q3 0 -1.232 -3.124** 13.506**** 
None 0 -0.023 -3.272**** 5.294**** 
C 0 -2.905* -3.152**** 3.393** 
C, t 0 -1.214 -3.099**** 3.324** 
C, q1 q2 q3 0 -2.905* -3.284** 3.846 
LPED 
C, t, q1 q2 q3 0 -1.288 -3.234** 3.760 
None 0 -0.101 -2.192** 19.009**** 
C 0 -1.958 -2.241** 19.710**** 
C, t 0 -2.038 -2.202** 19.096**** 
C, q1 q2 q3 0 -1.981 -2.111 20.255**** 
LMD 
C, t, q1 q2 q3 0 -2.055 -2.077 19.590**** 
None 0 0.990 -0.899 2.173 
C 0 -0.082 -0.886 2.039 
C, t 0 -2.985 -0.856 2.208 
C, q1 q2 q3 0 -0.255 -1.908 6.578* 
LPMD 
C, t, q1 q2 q3 0 -3.153 -2.057 7.056** 
Notes: Critical values where obtained from the HEGY tables for n=48. 
For the HEGY ‘t’ test (*), (**), (***) and (****) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, 2.5% and 
1% respectively. For the HEGY ‘F’ test (*), (**), (***) and (****) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 90%, 
95%, 97.5% and 99% respectively. Residuals of all regressions are white noise and approximately normally 
distributed without the addition of lags of yt4. The qi are seasonal dummies. 
Source: Authors own calculations. 
 
In the case of LPED and LMD there is consistent rejection of HB and HC and failure 
to reject HA when no seasonal dummies are included in the test specification. That 
is, LPED and LMD are I(1) as found before as long as no seasonal dummies are 
included in any regression procedure. 
 
In the case of LPMD there is consistent failure to reject HA, HB and HC implying unit 
root at all frequencies (consistent with earlier findings). This result suggests that for 
LPMD there is need to filter out the unit root components other then the one of 
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interest at zero frequency, this way the new LPMD, say LPMD1, would be I(1). The 
filter to remove the seasonal roots would be the following, where y1t is the filtered 
series already computed above: (I-L4)/(I-L)yt = (I+L+L2+L3) yt = y1t. 
 
3. Co-integration test 
 
The issue is to find weather the variables of interest are co integrated, that is if 
there is a linear combination of the pair of variables LMD and LPMD1 and the pair of 
variables LED and LPED that is stationary. If these pairs of variables are co 
integrated, then the linear combination would express the long term relationship 
among them. 
 
Engle and Granger (1987) proposed a two-step estimator for models involving co-
integrated variables. In the first step, the co-integrating parameters are estimated 
by running a static regression in the levels of the variables. In the second step, 
these are used in estimating an error correction model. Both steps require only 
OLS. The first step is our main interest here, in testing whether the residuals of the 
estimated regression in levels produces a stationary time series. The following are 
the estimated co-integrating equations: 
 
CET co-integrating equation: 
 
log(E/D) = (-1.38 + 0.01 t - 0.18 dcrisis) + 0.248 log(PE/PD) + Res1 
 
 
CES co-integrating equation: 
 
log(M/D) = (-1.61 – 0.004 t – 0.37 dcrisis) - 0.81 log(PM/PD) + Res2 
 
where t is time and dcrisis is a dummy variable that captures the shift during the 
current period of economic crisis, taking a value of 1 from the first quarter of 1999 
to the second quarter of 2004 and 0 otherwise. Res1 and Res2 are the residuals of 
the estimated equations. 
 
Table II.5 presents the standard ADF test applied to the estimated residuals of the 
co-integrating equations. Results show evidence of stationarity for Res1 when no 
deterministic variables are included or when only a constant is included in the test 
specification. Results also show consistent evidence of stationarity for Res2 under 
any deterministic specification of the test with one lag. There is also evidence of 
stationarity for Res2 when no deterministic variables are included in the test 
specification with four lags. 
 
The CET co-integrating equation suggests on average an elasticity of substitution of 
0.248 in the production of the export good relative to the domestic good when 
there is a change in their relative prices. In addition the positive sign indicates that, 
when the price of the export good increases while the price of the domestic good 
remains constant, the production of the export good will increase and the 
production of the domestic good will decrease. Result in accordance to theory. 
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Table II.5 
ADF unit root tests for the residuals of long term equations 
Variable Specification Lag length ADF statistic Stationarity 
None 1 (AIC) -3.271*** Stationary 
Constant 1 (AIC) -3.239** Stationary 
 
Res1 
Constant, trend 1 (AIC) -3.197* Non-Stationary 
None 4 (AIC) -2.281** Stationary 
Constant 4 (AIC) -2.250 Non-Stationary 
 
Res2 
Constant, trend 4 (AIC) -2.208 Non-Stationary 
None 1 (SIC) -3.985*** Stationary 
Constant 1 (SIC) -3.952*** Stationary 
 
Res2 
Constant, trend 1 (SIC) -3.918** Stationary 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The lag length was selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), 
both criteria coincide for Res1 but diverge for Res2. 
Source: Authors own calculations. 
 
The CES co-integrating equation suggests on average an elasticity of substitution of 
0.81 in the consumption of the import good relative to the domestic good when 
there is a change in their relative prices. In addition the negative sign indicates 
that, when the price of the import good increases while the price of the domestic 
good remains constant, the consumption of the import good will decrease and the 
consumption of the domestic good will increase. Result in accordance to theory. 
 
Although both estimated co-integrating parameters are inelastic, the CET 
parameter is more inelastic compared to the CES parameter, implying that 
producers are much slower to react to price changes (probably due to structural 
rigidities) compared to consumers. 
 
The following are the corresponding error correction models (ECM) or second step 
of the Engle and Granger estimation procedure, where ε1t and ε2t are white noise 
residuals. 
 
CET ECM: ∆ log(E/D)t = 0.006 – 0.44 Res1t-1 + ε1t 
t-Stat: (0.46)  (-3.64)  
R2=0.19 
Skewness= -0.45 
Kurtosis= 4.37 
 
 
CES ECM: ∆ log(M/D)t = -0.0002 – 0.32 ∆ log(M/D)t-3 - 0.65 Res2t-1 + ε2t 
t-Stat: (-0.01)   (-3.26)     (-5.56)  
R2=0.50 
Skewness= -0.46 
Kurtosis= 3.94 
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ANNEX III 
HOUSEHOLD TABLES 
 
Table III.1 
Adult equivalence scale by household size, 1999 
Household 
size Minimum Maximum Mean
1 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 1.5 1.7 1.7
3 2.0 2.4 2.3
4 2.5 3.1 2.8
5 3.0 3.8 3.4
6 3.5 4.5 4.0
7 4.2 5.2 4.6
8 4.5 5.9 5.1
9 5.2 6.6 5.9
10 5.7 7.1 6.4
11 6.8 7.2 7.0
12 7.5 8.3 7.9
16 10.3 10.3 10.3
 
Total 1.0 10.3 3.6  
Source: Author own calculation based on MECOVI 99 
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Table III.2 
Impact on households from negative terms of trade shock 
(Bs per capita per month) 
 Income Consumption Difference 
Description Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
       
URBAN 
1 (poorest) 200.8 192.3 108.5 102.8 -8.5 -5.8 
2 249.2 236.3 223.7 211.8 -12.8 -11.9 
3 380.5 361.8 336.1 318.2 -18.8 -17.9 
4 546.2 519.0 510.9 483.8 -27.2 -27.1 
5 (richest) 1,203.6 1,146.9 1,059.6 1,003.7 -56.7 -55.9 
       
Total 670.5 638.2 598.1 566.4 -32.3 -31.6 
       
RURAL 
1 (poorest) 68.4 65.0 90.3 85.5 -3.4 -4.8 
2 142.8 135.8 205.8 194.9 -7.0 -10.9 
3 262.0 248.9 333.7 316.0 -13.1 -17.7 
4 388.6 369.4 503.4 476.8 -19.1 -26.6 
5 (richest) 641.7 607.8 1,012.4 958.9 -33.9 -53.5 
       
Total 146.6 139.3 199.5 189.0 -7.3 -10.6 
       
TOTAL 
1 (poorest) 77.8 74.0 91.6 86.7 -3.8 -4.9 
2 186.4 177.0 213.1 201.8 -9.4 -11.3 
3 355.5 338.0 335.6 317.8 -17.6 -17.8 
4 525.3 499.2 509.9 482.9 -26.2 -27.0 
5 (richest) 1,185.6 1,129.6 1,058.1 1,002.3 -56.0 -55.8 
       
Total 476.3 453.3 450.4 426.5 -23.1 -23.8 
Source: Author own calculations. 
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Table III.3 
Impact on households from reduction in foreign saving flows 
(Bs per capita per month) 
 Income Consumption Difference 
Description Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
       
URBAN 
1 (poorest) 200.8 199.7 108.5 94.5 -1.1 -14.0 
2 249.2 247.5 223.7 194.9 -1.6 -28.8 
3 380.5 378.1 336.1 292.9 -2.4 -43.2 
4 546.2 542.7 510.9 445.4 -3.5 -65.5 
5 (richest) 1,203.6 1,196.4 1,059.6 924.6 -7.2 -135.0 
       
Total 670.5 666.4 598.1 521.6 -4.1 -76.4 
       
RURAL 
1 (poorest) 68.4 68.0 90.3 78.7 -0.4 -11.6 
2 142.8 141.9 205.8 179.4 -0.9 -26.4 
3 262.0 260.3 333.7 290.9 -1.7 -42.8 
4 388.6 386.1 503.4 439.1 -2.4 -64.4 
5 (richest) 641.7 637.4 1,012.4 883.0 -4.3 -129.4 
       
Total 146.6 145.7 199.5 173.9 -0.9 -25.6 
       
TOTAL 
1 (poorest) 77.8 77.3 91.6 79.8 -0.5 -11.8 
2 186.4 185.2 213.1 185.8 -1.2 -27.4 
3 355.5 353.3 335.6 292.5 -2.2 -43.1 
4 525.3 522.0 509.9 444.6 -3.3 -65.3 
5 (richest) 1,185.6 1,178.5 1,058.1 923.3 -7.1 -134.8 
       
Total 476.3 473.4 450.4 392.8 -2.9 -57.6 
Source: Author own calculations. 
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Table III.4 
Impact on households from social expenditure policy 
(Bs per capita per month) 
 Income Consumption Difference 
Description Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
       
URBAN 
1 (poorest) 200.8 220.3 108.5 113.0 19.5 4.5 
2 249.2 278.6 223.7 232.9 29.4 9.2 
3 380.5 423.5 336.1 349.9 43.0 13.8 
4 546.2 608.5 510.9 531.8 62.4 20.9 
5 (richest) 1,203.6 1,333.5 1,059.6 1,102.7 129.9 43.1 
       
Total 670.5 744.5 598.1 622.4 74.1 24.4 
       
RURAL 
1 (poorest) 68.4 76.3 90.3 94.0 7.9 3.7 
2 142.8 158.8 205.8 214.2 16.0 8.4 
3 262.0 291.9 333.7 347.3 29.9 13.7 
4 388.6 432.4 503.4 524.0 43.9 20.5 
5 (richest) 641.7 719.4 1,012.4 1,053.7 77.7 41.3 
       
Total 146.6 163.3 199.5 207.7 16.7 8.2 
       
TOTAL 
1 (poorest) 77.8 86.5 91.6 95.4 8.7 3.8 
2 186.4 207.9 213.1 221.9 21.5 8.7 
3 355.5 395.8 335.6 349.3 40.2 13.8 
4 525.3 585.2 509.9 530.8 59.9 20.9 
5 (richest) 1,185.6 1,313.8 1,058.1 1,101.1 128.2 43.0 
       
Total 476.3 529.1 450.4 468.7 52.8 18.4 
Source: Author own calculations. 
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Table III.5 
Impact on households from low output growth 
(Bs per capita per month) 
 Income Consumption Difference 
Description Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
       
URBAN 
1 (poorest) 200.8 217.4 108.5 109.8 16.6 1.3 
2 249.2 274.2 223.7 226.3 25.0 2.6 
3 380.5 417.0 336.1 340.1 36.5 4.0 
4 546.2 599.1 510.9 517.0 53.0 6.1 
5 (richest) 1,203.6 1,313.9 1,059.6 1,072.2 110.3 12.6 
       
Total 670.5 733.4 598.1 605.1 62.9 7.1 
       
RURAL 
1 (poorest) 68.4 75.1 90.3 91.4 6.7 1.1 
2 142.8 156.4 205.8 208.2 13.6 2.4 
3 262.0 287.4 333.7 337.6 25.4 4.0 
4 388.6 425.8 503.4 509.4 37.2 6.0 
5 (richest) 641.7 707.6 1,012.4 1,024.4 65.9 12.0 
       
Total 146.6 160.8 199.5 201.9 14.2 2.4 
       
TOTAL 
1 (poorest) 77.8 85.2 91.6 92.7 7.4 1.1 
2 186.4 204.6 213.1 215.7 18.3 2.5 
3 355.5 389.7 335.6 339.5 34.2 4.0 
4 525.3 576.2 509.9 516.0 50.9 6.0 
5 (richest) 1,185.6 1,294.4 1,058.1 1,070.7 108.9 12.6 
       
Total 476.3 521.2 450.4 455.7 44.8 5.3 
Source: Author own calculations. 
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Table III.6 
Impact on households from all combined cases 
(Bs per capita per month) 
 Income Consumption Difference 
Description Base Current Base Current Income Consumption 
       
URBAN 
1 (poorest) 200.8 197.2 108.5 94.4 -3.6 -14.1 
2 249.2 243.8 223.7 194.6 -5.4 -29.0 
3 380.5 372.7 336.1 292.5 -7.8 -43.6 
4 546.2 534.8 510.9 444.8 -11.4 -66.1 
5 (richest) 1,203.6 1,179.9 1,059.6 923.4 -23.7 -136.2 
       
Total 670.5 657.0 598.1 520.9 -13.5 -77.1 
       
RURAL 
1 (poorest) 68.4 67.0 90.3 78.6 -1.4 -11.7 
2 142.8 139.8 205.8 179.2 -2.9 -26.7 
3 262.0 256.5 333.7 290.5 -5.5 -43.2 
4 388.6 380.6 503.4 438.5 -8.0 -64.9 
5 (richest) 641.7 627.5 1,012.4 881.9 -14.2 -130.6 
       
Total 146.6 143.5 199.5 173.7 -3.1 -25.8 
       
TOTAL 
1 (poorest) 77.8 76.2 91.6 79.7 -1.6 -11.9 
2 186.4 182.4 213.1 185.5 -3.9 -27.6 
3 355.5 348.2 335.6 292.1 -7.3 -43.5 
4 525.3 514.4 509.9 444.0 -10.9 -65.9 
5 (richest) 1,185.6 1,162.2 1,058.1 922.1 -23.4 -136.0 
       
Total 476.3 466.7 450.4 392.2 -9.6 -58.1 
Source: Author own calculation. 
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Poverty Hypothesis Testing 
 
The analysis of household welfare is based on poverty indicators computed using 
the MECOVI household survey of 1999.  
 
The MECOVI survey has a stratified and two stages sample design. The four strata 
used correspond to a geographical stratification. The sample selection has two 
stages; the Primary Sample Units (PSU) selection in a first stage, and the selection 
of households inside the PSU selected, in a second stage. The Table below presents 
the number of PSU´s and sample size. 
 
Table III.7 
MECOVI sample design 
Strata
Primary 
Survey Units 
(PSU)
Persons in 
sample
Main cities 167 5,611
Rest of urban area 26 960
Rural area 44 1,575
Disperse area 72 4,885
Total 309 13,031  
         Source: INE. 
 
The statistical significance of results must be analyzed considering the 
characteristics of sample design. Two tests were performed, first for the 
significance of poverty chances and second for significance of poverty differences in 
poverty profiles. 
 
Test of poverty changes: 
 
The main indicator of poverty changes is the head count ratio (denoted as P0), 
which represents the percentage of poor population. We compare this indicator in 
base year with the indicator after every shock analyzed.  For example, in the terms 
of trade case, the null hypothesis was: Head count ratio in base year is equal to 
Head count ratio obtained after the terms of trade shock. Does poverty increase in 
this case have statistical significance? 
 
Table III.8 
Testing significance of one poverty outcome 
Base year
Terms of 
trade
TOTAL
Head count ratio 0.4144365 0.4252108
Standard error 0.0210234 0.0210128
F(1, 305) 17.34
Prob > F 0.0000  
    Source: Author own calculation.  
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The Wald test statistic computed is: 
 
)1,(~
1 +−+− kdkFW
kd
kd
 
 
Where: d = number of PSU´s minus the number of strata and k = degrees of 
freedom. In our example, the F(1,305) statistic is 17.34 and the p-coefficient is less 
than 0.00001.  Therefore, the poverty increase has statistic significance. The 
following Table is the outcome from applying this test to the poverty outcome of 
every shock. 
 
Table III.9 
Testing significance over all poverty outcomes 
 Base year 
Terms of 
trade 
Foreign 
saving 
Social 
expenditure 
Output 
growth All cases 
TOTAL       
Head count ratio 0.4144365 0.4252108 0.448269 0.4059149 0.4059149 0.4372323 
Standard error 0.0210234 0.0210128 0.0209469 0.0209888 0.0209888 0.0209702 
F(1, 305)   17.34 50.89 13.49 13.49 39.36 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
       
URBAN       
Head count ratio 0.2376038 0.249976 0.272807 0.2270452 0.2270452 0.2619642 
Standard error 0.0193698 0.0199026 0.0209009 0.0186608 0.0186608 0.0204875 
F(1, 305)   12 36.95 8.97 8.97 26.3 
Prob > F   0.0006 0.0000 0.0030 0.0030 0.0000 
       
RURAL       
Head count ratio 0.7147295 0.7227902 0.7462343 0.7096669 0.7096669 0.734868 
Standard error 0.0326362 0.0319245 0.0292208 0.0330455 0.0330455 0.030672 
F(1, 305)   5.48 14.78 8.53 8.53 13.07 
Prob > F   0.0199 0.0001 0.0038 0.0038 0.0004 
 Source: Author own calculations. 
 
 
Test of poverty differences in poverty profiles: 
 
A poverty profile allows comparisons of poverty in subpopulations.  The age-group, 
sex, ethnicity and other variables was selected for analysis. Starting with a base 
year poverty measure (head count ratio) and comparing the same poverty measure 
after all shocks, it is possible to identify particular groups were poverty has 
increased. 
 
In the case of sex, the null hypothesis is that the after shocks head count ratio of 
males is equal to head count ratio of females. In the ethnicity case, the null is that 
the after shocks percentage of poor people is equal for Aymara, Quechua, Spanish 
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and others. For example, at the national poverty level, does the difference in 
percent of female poor respect to male poor have statistic significance?  
 
Table III.10 
Testing significance of one poverty profile 
Base year All cases Difference
Male 41.2 43.6 2.4
Female 41.7 43.8 2.1  
    Source: Author own calculation. 
 
The F statistic is 2.18 and p-value is 0.145, therefore we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. The following Table is the outcome from applying this test to all poverty 
profiles. 
 
Table III.11 
Testing significance over all poverty profiles 
Variable F statistic Prob > F 
Age group F(4, 302) 1.31 0.2654
Sex F(1, 305) 2.18 0.1405
Ethnicity F(3, 303) 0.52 0.6669
Self-identification F(3, 303) 0.67 0.5680
Education F(5, 301) 2.52 0.0298
Migrant condition F(1, 305) 0.00 0.9816
Employment F(3, 303) 1.52 0.2081
Economic Activity F(2, 304) 2.96 0.0532
Condition F(4, 302) 8.20 0.0000
Sector F(2, 304) 0.24 0.7854
Source: Author own calculations. 
Null Hypothesis: head count ratio i = head count ratio j , where i and j are categories. 
 
